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A Failure to Supervise: 
How the Bureaucracy and the 
Courts Abandoned Their Intended 
Roles under ERISA 
 
Lauren R. Roth* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In 1922, Roscoe Pound wrote that “[w]ealth in a 
commercial age is made up largely of promises.”1 The primary 
purpose of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”) was to ensure that employers honored their 
promises to pay pension benefits to employees.2 Congress had 
to protect employees, however, without discouraging employers 
from voluntarily providing pension plans.3 As part of that 
balancing act, Congress decided to delegate substantial 
responsibility for administering ERISA to employers whose 
fiduciary role mandates that they protect employees who 
participate in ERISA plans (“participants”) and their 
beneficiaries.4 
 
  * Copyright © 2014.  Acting Assistant Professor, New York University 
School of Law. Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Columbia University. 
J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., The George Washington University. I thank 
Ira Katznelson, Robert Lieberman, Michael Ting, and James Wooten for their 
insight. I am grateful for the generous support I have received through my 
time at Columbia University from both the Graduate School of Arts and 
Sciences and the Department of Political Science. 
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(1922), cited in John H. Langbein, Rise of the Management Trust, TR. & 
ESTATES 53 (2004). 
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 2, 29 U.S.C.        
§ 1001 (2012); ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
3. Pension and Welfare Plans: Hearing on S. 3421, S. 1024, S. 1103 and 
S. 1255 Before S. Subcomm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th CONG. 122 
(1968) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits). 
4. See ERISA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2012). 
1
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ERISA permits executives and agents of the employer to 
serve as fiduciaries5 but includes a broad definition of fiduciary 
to ensure that they act in the best interests of participants and 
beneficiaries instead of the employer. Anyone who has 
discretion to manage the plan or its assets or “has any 
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan” is a fiduciary and subject to 
ERISA’s enforcement provisions.6 
New York Senator, Republican Jacob Javits, was a long-
time proponent of pension reform. With respect to enforcement, 
Javits wrote: 
 
I think a single agency is required for the 
purpose and it will be a very difficult task to 
regulate the operation of the employee benefit 
 
5. ERISA § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) (2012) (“Nothing in section 1106 of 
this title shall be construed to prohibit any fiduciary from. . . (3) serving as a 
fiduciary in addition to being an officer, employee, agent, or other 
representative of a party in interest.”). 
6. Id. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012). As the 
conference committee explained: 
 
Under this definition, fiduciaries include officers and 
directors of a plan, members of a plan’s investment 
committee and persons who select these individuals. 
Consequently, the definition includes persons who have 
authority and responsibility with respect to the matter in 
question, regardless of their formal title. The term 
‘fiduciary’ also includes any person who renders investment 
advice for a fee and includes persons to whom ‘discretionary’ 
duties have been delegated by named fiduciaries. 
 
While the ordinary functions of consultants and advisers to 
employee benefit plans (other than investment advisers) 
may not be considered as fiduciary functions, it must be 
recognized that there will be situations where such 
consultants and advisers may because of their special 
expertise, in effect, be exercising discretionary authority or 
control with respect to the management or administration of 
such plan or some authority or control regarding its assets. 
In such cases, they are to be regarded as having assumed 
fiduciary obligations within the meaning of the applicable 
definition. 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 64-65 (1974) (Conf. Rep.). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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plans sufficiently to assure legitimate 
expectations of employee participation while 
avoiding undue and unnecessary interference in 
the operation of these plans. Overregulation or 
unnecessary regulation would be worse than 
none for it would deter the installation and 
improvement of these much-needed programs. 
We have to steer between frustrated expectations 
for pension plan members growing out of no 
regulation and frustrations caused by 
overregulation which will deter the employer 
from instituting a pension plan.7 
 
Despite the consensus among most pension reform 
advocates that a single bureaucratic agency was preferable to 
fragmented bureaucratic jurisdiction, Congress (for the reasons 
discussed below) placed principal responsibility for enforcing 
the statute with two existing bureaucratic agencies rather than 
creating a single agency to regulate pensions and adjudicate 
disputes.8 
The decision to rely on two agencies to enforce the statute 
paved the way for the federal courts to develop pension policy 
because Congress depended in part upon a private litigation 
remedy instead of placing the adjudicative function within the 
bureaucracy.9 That remedy placed a heavy burden on plan 
participants to initiate and litigate their claims in federal 
court.10 
Congress intended for courts to enforce ERISA’s primary 
mission of safeguarding pension promises.11 As was the case 
 
7. Pension and Welfare Plans: Hearing on S. 3421, S. 1024, S. 1103 and 
S. 1255 Before S. Subcomm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th CONG. 122 
(1968) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits). 
8. As discussed further below, participants and beneficiaries were 
authorized under ERISA to file lawsuits to enforce their rights under the 
statute, and the courts have sole adjudicative power under ERISA to resolve 
disputes between plan administrators and participants and beneficiaries. 
9. Private Pension Plan Reform Part II: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Private Pension Plans of the Comm. Fin., 93d CONG. 222 (1974) (statement of 
Frank Cummings) [hereinafter “Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II”]. 
10. See id. 
11. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
3
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before ERISA (when plan participants relied on trust theories 
and breach of contract to seek redress in court), however, the 
courts gave sustained deference to the decisions made by 
employer representatives.12 Faced with fiduciaries who had 
more experience and expertise in the administration of benefit 
plans and their own conflicting objective of judicial efficiency, 
courts abdicated the role Congress intended for them to play in 
the regulation of private pensions after ERISA and expanded 
the delegation of authority to fiduciaries.13 This left fiduciaries 
the power to decide all benefit claims essentially without 
supervision by an outside, disinterested party. And it left 
participants with little more protection than they had prior to 
ERISA. 
Section II of this Article addresses how courts failed to 
adequately supervise employers administering pension plans 
before ERISA. Relying on a number of different legal theories—
from an initial theory that pensions were gratuities offered by 
employers to the recognition that pension promises could create 
contractual rights—the courts repeatedly found ways to allow 
employers to promise much and provide little to workers 
expecting retirement security. In Section III, this Article 
addresses how Congress failed to create an effective structure 
for strong bureaucratic enforcement and the bureaucratic 
agencies with enforcement responsibilities failed to fulfill those 
functions. Finally, in Section IV, this Article discusses how the 
courts abdicated their duty to supervise ERISA fiduciaries once 
bureaucratic failings made ERISA’s private litigation remedy 
and the supervisory function of the courts increasingly 
important. 
As the government expands its role in regulating the 
provision of healthcare while maintaining employer 
involvement, an examination of the balance between employer 
control and worker rights under ERISA should inform 
implementation and enforcement of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. While legislative battles over healthcare 
have dominated the news, this Article serves as a reminder 
 
12. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1564 
n. 7 (11th Cir. 1990). 
13. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the 
Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma, 22 REG. 30, 37 (1999). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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that the execution of laws can undo congressional bargains. 
 
II. Pension Lawsuits Prior to ERISA 
 
Prior to ERISA, employees faced many obstacles when 
challenging the pension decisions of employers in the courts. 
Consider the testimony of Frank Cummings, Chief of Staff to 
Senator Javits during the passage of ERISA, before the Senate 
Finance Committee on June 4, 1973 regarding the problems 
faced by a participant seeking to litigate against a pension 
plan.14 
Cummings started his discussion at the point when a 
hypothetical participant tells a potential lawyer that “they owe 
him a pension” or “they are misusing the money in the pension 
fund.”15 The first of several problems facing the lawyer was to 
figure out who “they” are—what corporate entity employs the 
participant, who are the trustees, which bank holds the money, 
which insurance company (perhaps) funds the plan, and which 
unions and officers are involved.16 
The next question is what jurisdiction’s law to apply and 
whether a single court has jurisdiction over all of the relevant 
parties.17 The individuals and entities that make up the less 
than cohesive “they” in question may be located in several 
different states, and the plan documents may not have a choice 
of law provision.18 
The final—and most substantive question—is what legal 
claim the participant will assert and whether participants and 
their lawyers will have an adequate incentive to litigate.19 If 
the lawyer argues misuse of funds by the plan, the recovery 
will go to the pension fund and not the individual plaintiff.20 
The plaintiff gets nothing except a more well-funded pension 
 
14. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9 (statement of 
Frank Cummings). 
15. Id. at 221. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 221 
(statement of Frank Cummings). 
5
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fund.21 If the plaintiff sues to recover his pension, the value of 
the lawsuit is the net present value of one pension.22 In either 
case, the benefit recovered, if any, will likely be too small to 
motivate most lawyers to tackle the complexities of pension 
law.23 Only in the event of a class action lawsuit, which is 
typically organized and financed by a larger entity (such as a 
union), does the potential recovery justify the costs and 
uncertainties of litigation for prospective lawyers.24 
With great foresight, Cummings concluded: 
 
In short, private lawsuits, under existing law, do 
not provide a meaningful remedy for the 
employee in most pension cases. What is needed 
is a national law, with a national agency to 
enforce it, which will get this whole matter out of 
the area of ordinary, garden variety, litigation, 
which simply does not work.25 
 
As Cummings made clear, private litigation remedies did 
not sufficiently protect employees prior to ERISA. 
 
A. Pension Promises as Gratuities 
 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and lasting until 
the middle of the twentieth century, courts viewed pensions as 
gratuities (i.e., gifts) to be altered or withdrawn freely by 
employers.26 Plan documents for pensions also limited an 
 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 222. “You can’t sue for a pension today. Even if the plan owes 
it to you, you can’t sue unless someone is backing you or unless you have a 
class action. The legal fee for the first day of the lawsuit would exceed the 
amount of recovery.” Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 13 
(statement of Frank Cummings). 
26. The gratuity theory was followed in cases until the 1950s. JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 134 (4th ed. 2006) 
(“Because the plan authorized the employer to revoke promised pension 
benefits at will, those promises were treated like a promise to make a gift in 
the future, which is unenforceable until the gift is actually completed. (Notice 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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employer’s legal liability to employees, and courts found that 
offering pensions to employees created no judiciable rights.27 
For example, in McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., the plaintiff 
sued to recover $52.54 from a pension fund established by his 
employer. 28 The court found that the amount credited to his 
“account” under the plan by his employer was a gift completed 
only upon “actual payment” and that the employee had no 
vested right to the money until payment.29 In the governing 
documents, the employer had reserved the right to determine 
whether its employees were entitled to the “gift”, and the court 
refused to review that decision: 
 
It seems to me that the scheme by which this 
fund is created is simply a promise on the part of 
the defendant to give to its employees a certain 
sum in the future, with an absolute reservation 
that it may at any time determine not to 
complete the gift, and if it does so determine, an 
employee has no right of action to recover the 
sum standing to his credit on the books of the 
pension fund.30 
 
the similarity to the common law doctrine of employment at will.)”). 
27. Timothy J. Heinsz, A Reappraisal of the Private Pension System, 57 
CORNELL L. REV. 278, 282 (1972); see Norman Stein, Raiders of the Corporate 
Pension Plan: The Reversion of Excess Plan Assets to the Employer, 5 AM. J. 
TAX POL’Y 117, 138 (1986) (stating the majority rule for early pension 
promises was that they were “more akin to charity than to earned wages” and 
reviewing a few representative cases and relevant treatises). 
28. McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1898). 
29. Id. at 99-100. 
30. Id. at 100; see, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790-91 (8th 
Cir. 1944) (“The company was within its rights in providing that the pensions 
awarded under the plan were gratuities . . . By the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the company and administered by the Board of Pensions [an 
entity set up and controlled by the employer], the company only obligated 
itself to pension such employees as the Board of Pensions, in the fair exercise 
of the power conferred upon it, determined to be eligible to receive the 
benefits of the plan.”); Fickling v. Pollard, 179 S.E. 582, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1935) (Although the plaintiff argued the existence of an implied contract, the 
cessation of his disability pension payments was not actionable because the 
payments “amounted to no more than a gratuitous arrangement by the 
company for the payment, at its option, of pensions to old employees . . . [and] 
was ‘expressly’ made subject to denial, suspension, or permanent 
7
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Courts that denied participants their pensions emphasized 
the voluntary, non-contributory (i.e., entirely employer funded) 
nature of the plans.31 The gratuitous nature of these plans and 
the reservations of the employer’s right to amend or cancel the 
terms at any time meant that employees’ and retirees’ pension 
benefits never vested.32 Even in cases where the employer and 
the court acknowledged that the employer’s pension promises 
benefited the employer through improved employee morale and 
increased tenure based on the promise of a pension, courts 
refused to find that pension promises constituted a binding 
contract.33 Some courts still denied claims even when 
 
discontinuance by the company at any time.”). 
31. See Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l Union, 307 F.2d 
671, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“Here, the Pension Plan voluntarily established by 
the appellee Union required no contribution from Neuffer or any other 
participant, and none was made. The Union could properly prescribe, as it 
did here, conditions on payment of pension benefits reasonably related to the 
Union’s welfare.”); Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880, 
882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954) (“These provisions say that the defendant is paying 
the entire cost of the plan; that the payments are voluntary; that no 
contractual relationship is intended or created between the defendant and its 
employees.”); Umshler v. Umshler, 76 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947) 
(“The uncontroverted evidence shows that the pension plan of defendant 
railroad company is wholly voluntary. All the benefits are paid out of the 
corporate treasury. No pension fund is provided, nor were any contributions 
required of or made by defendant Umshler or any other employee and, so far 
as the record shows, all the expense of the administration of the plan is borne 
by defendant railroad company.”). 
32. See Kravitz v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 160 N.Y.S.2d 716, 
719 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (“The donor of a gift has the right to fix the terms 
and the objects of his bounty. The terms of the Retirement Plan give no 
vested rights to others than those specifically provided for. . . . The most that 
may be said for plaintiffs is that each enjoyed an inchoate gift. This never 
ripened into a vested one.”); Dolan v. Heller Bros., 104 A.2d 860, 861 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1954) (“[I]t seems well settled in other jurisdictions that a 
pension plan which is purely voluntary on the part of the employer and to 
which the employee makes no contribution, is not an enforceable contract, 
but a mere gratuity, in which the employee has no vested right until he 
begins to receive benefits thereunder.”). 
33. See Hughes, 117 N.E.2d at 882. 
 
Defendant concedes that an employer receives a benefit 
from instituting a pension plan by way of increased stability 
of employment and in the greater security and contentment 
of its employees and that it is largely for this reason it 
instituted and presently maintains such a program. It does 
not follow, however, that where a pension plan is placed into 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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recognizing that pension promises were a form of deferred 
compensation. As the New York Court of Appeals stated when 
denying former employees access to funds set aside in a 
retirement and profit sharing plan: 
 
There were some references in the testimony 
that a portion of the funds would otherwise have 
been distributed as bonuses, and in that sense 
the members were contributors. However, 
bonuses were gratuities which might or might 
not be distributed at the pleasure of the Board of 
Directors of the Company. It cannot be gainsaid, 
we think, that the benefits conferred on the 
Members of the Plan were tantamount to gifts, 
and the Company had the right, as the donor, to 
fix the terms and limitations of the gifts.34 
 
As a federal appeals court noted in denying pension 
benefits: “No statute then in force required of the company the 
assumption of the burden which it took upon itself in providing 
for pensions for its employees. It therefore had the right . . . to 
condition its bounty in such manner as it saw fit.”35 While 
pension law subsequently advanced beyond viewing pension 
promises as gratuities, the voluntary nature of our private 
 
effect the employee thereby acquires a vested right to have 
the plan kept in effect. 
 
Id. 
34. Fernekes v. CMP Indus., Inc., 195 N.E.2d 884, 887 (N.Y. 1963). But 
cf. Schofield v. Zion’s Co-Op. Mercantile Inst., 39 P.2d 342 (Utah 1934). In 
Schofield, the court found that a contract did exist providing the retirees with 
a vested pension that could not be reduced. The terms of the pension plan 
stated that the purpose of the plan was to “encourage long and faithful 
service” and that after such service an employee would be entitled to a 
pension in the amount stated in the plan. Id. at 344-45. The court held that 
the pension acted as an inducement for the plaintiffs to continue their 
employment, and after their long service and the determination that they had 
met the terms required for the pension, no modification of the contract was 
possible by the employer. Id. at 345. The lack of equivocation and plan 
language carefully stating that the pension promised was a gift that could be 
modified or withdrawn at any point distinguishes this case from the bulk of 
pension claims during this era, however. 
35. Menke, 140 F.2d at 790. 
9
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pension system remains. 
 
B. Pension Promises as Contracts 
 
Although in the decades prior to ERISA’s enactment most 
courts ruled that pension promises were contracts and not 
gratuities,36 “employees fair[ed] no better under this theory 
than they did under the gratuity theory.”37 Most judges 
believed that they had no choice but to favor employers and 
strictly construe the terms of the pension plans that they 
drafted.38 
Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l Union, 
highlights the evolution of pension jurisprudence from viewing 
pensions as gratuities to contracts. 39 The district court initially 
approved the defendant union’s actions forfeiting a retiree’s 
pension and terminating payments.40 It held that there were 
“none of the essential elements of a contract” and it would not 
construe the terms of a “voluntary non-contributory plan 
strictly against an employer.”41 Since the employer reserved its 
rights to modify the plan and to determine eligibility and 
 
36. See Heinz v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce of St. Louis, 237 F. 942, 949-50 
(8th Cir. 1916), for an early example of the recognition of contractual rights 
to a pension. 
37. Heinsz, supra note 27, at 284; see Stein, supra note 27, at 138-39 
(finding trend in case law towards recognition of unilateral contract rights 
through pension plans by the 1930s and stating that “some courts, faced with 
the argument that employees who were promised pensions just might have 
given some consideration—namely, their labor—found more satisfactory legal 
doctrines to deny many dissatisfied employees their pensions most of the 
time”). One dissenting judge protested a circuit court decision upholding an 
employer’s termination of a retiree’s pension, writing, “I am unwilling to 
endorse the employer’s brutal treatment of a pensioner who served it for most 
of his mature life. We open ourselves to the charge that judicial concern for 
individual rights in this jurisdiction is confined arbitrarily and capriciously to 
criminal cases.” Neuffer, 307 F.2d at 676 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
38. See Wallace v. N. Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E. 2d 139, 143 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1937) (“To hold otherwise, is to become involved in a 
discussion of purely ethical questions with no pertinent rule of law or related 
principle in equity to form a standard for our conclusion.”). 
39. Neuffer, 307 F.2d at 671. 
40. Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l Union, 193 F.Supp. 
699, 700 (D.D.C. 1961). 
41. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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forfeiture under the terms of the plan, the union was within its 
rights to suspend payments.42 The appellate court, while still 
siding with the employer, found that the terms of the pension 
plan did create a valid contract between the employee and the 
union.43 Any vested rights created by the plan were subject to 
reasonable conditions placed on the continued receipt of a 
pension, however, and the court “nevertheless enforces 
reasonable contracts.”44 The strongly worded dissent, on the 
other hand, affirms that a pension is now considered a 
contractual form of deferred compensation and not a gratuity 
but disagrees with the result reached by the majority.45 Since 
the employer drafted the contract, it should have been strictly 
construed against the union.46 
Under the “unilateral contract theory,” a pension contract 
was created when the employer offered a pension plan and the 
employee accepted employment or remained on the job based in 
part on that pension—relying on the promise of a future 
pension and presumably accepting some decrease in current 
wages.47 To qualify for a pension, the employee had to satisfy 
 
42. Id. 
43. Neuffer, 307 F.2d at 673. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 674 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
46. Id. at 674-75 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
47. See Heinsz, supra note 27, at 283-85; Stein, supra note 27, at 138-40; 
see also In re Schenectady R.R., 93 F. Supp. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (holding 
that promised pensions were a part of the consideration for employees’ labor 
under the collective bargaining agreement and that, like wages, vacation pay, 
and other benefits, pensions were “a part of the reward for his effort”); 
Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807, 814 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (“[W]here the 
employer has a pension plan and the employee knows of it, continued 
employment constitutes consideration for the promise to pay the pension. The 
pension is considered to be deferred compensation.”); Gearns v. Commercial 
Cable Co., 32 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1942) (denying plaintiff’s 
pension claims on other grounds but confirming that “it is doubtful if 
defendant arbitrarily could have refused payment as the plan was not merely 
a benefaction but a contract supported by plaintiff’s consideration of 
continued services under the plan and his acceptance of other obligations 
under it.”). Compare Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878, 880 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1937) (“During these years [the employee] was led to believe 
that 2 per cent of his earnings would be paid him when the company 
considered him more favorably in the position of a pensioner than as an 
employee receiving a full salary or wage. The appellant has made its election. 
It has concluded that he has reached the point of industrial old age. . . . He, 
11
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the terms set forth in the pension plan’s governing 
documents—none of which he had any say in—and then had to 
hope he was not laid off from his job and that the employer 
remained financially sound.48 
In Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Jones, for example, a Texas 
appellate court found that the defendant employer could not 
terminate the plaintiff’s pension because he had been 
committed to a state-run mental facility.49 Quoting the trial 
court decision, the appellate court found: 
 
That the offer made under said pension system 
was an inducement to the company’s employees 
to remain in its service and render to it the long 
continued faithful service, giving their entire 
time to its service, as required, in order to reap 
the benefits offered under said pension system, 
and that the rendering of the long continued 
faithful service of its employees as required by it, 
was a benefit to the railroad company, and that 
 
however, cannot be in good faith and justice denied the alternative held out 
by the employer as an inducement, for more than a quarter of a century, to 
continue service with the appellant.”) and Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 
194 N.E. 441 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (refusing to allow the company to avoid its 
contractual pension obligation by firing an employee arbitrarily at age 65 
because its pension promises were “a daily inducement to continuation of 
service and to exertion to satisfy”), with Bos v. U.S. Rubber Co., 224 P.2d 386 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that his discharge at age 
60 violated his pension contract because he had no right to retire under the 
plan at age 60 and receive a pension). 
48. See Heinsz, supra note 27, at 283 (noting that even if an employee 
was able to “survive the hazards of job changes, layoffs, mergers, or business 
failures, and . . . meet all of the conditions of the employer’s pension plan, the 
insurance contract or trust indenture, or the collective bargaining agreement, 
he may still be denied his pension.”). In Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp., the 
plaintiff sued to receive early retirement pension benefits after relying on a 
booklet issued by the company which failed to mention that the employee 
needed the company’s consent to retire early and receive the pension to which 
he had contributed for years. Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp., 145 F. Supp. 909, 
910 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Setting aside a jury verdict that ruled that the plaintiff’s 
reliance on the booklet was reasonable, the court held that the booklet could 
not replace the tripartite contract between the employee, the employer, and 
the insurance company guaranteeing the pension benefits—a contract the 
plaintiff had never seen. Id. at 912. 
49. See Tex. & N. O. R. Co. v. Jones, 103 S.W.2d 1043, 1046 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1937). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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the offer and acceptance by performance 
constituted a mutual consideration.50 
 
The court was careful to note, however, that the pension 
promise only became a “binding contract” after the employee 
had continued his employment with the employer until 
retirement and officially been awarded a pension.51 
Finally, in a mistake not likely to be repeated by savvy 
employers following the case, the company failed to include an 
unconditional reservation of its right to terminate pension 
payments at any time in the plan documents, instead only 
reserving the right to cancel payments due to gross misconduct 
by the former employee.52 Thus, many employees who forfeited 
their pensions still remained unprotected by the contractual 
framework.53 
Even if an employee remained with his employer until 
retirement, an employee could still be denied his pension based 
on decisions by those administering the pension plan.54 
Employers created boards composed of their executives to 
administer pension plans, giving them the power to decide 
whether an employee qualified for a pension.55 Their decisions 
sometimes had harsh consequences for employees.56 For 
example, in Menke v. Thompson, a federal appellate court 
affirmed the denial of a pension to an employee of the Missouri 
Pacific Railroad Company from 1886 to 1932.57 Any person who 
voluntarily left employment, even for a day, was denied a 
 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 1045-46. 
52. Id. at 1046. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
55. Jones, 103 S.W.2d at 1045. Employees in collectively bargained plans 
at least had the representation of union officials on these boards. Heinsz, 
supra note 27, at 284. 
56. See Wallace, 13 N.E. 2d at 143 (company could abandon its pension 
plan and any employees or former employees who had not yet qualified for a 
pension were not entitled to any benefits—no matter how close they were to 
qualifying for a pension); Heinsz, supra note 27, at 284 (“For example, boards 
have been allowed to disqualify employees whom they concluded did not meet 
physical disability requirements in a pension plan, despite medical evidence 
to the contrary.”). 
57. Menke,140 F.2d at 792. 
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pension under the terms of the plan, and Menke went on strike 
in July 1922 and did not return until October 1922.58 Although 
the company argued that the pensions were gratuities, the 
court found that even under the unilateral contract theory, 
Menke was not entitled to his pension.59 The terms of the plan 
gave the Board of Pensions nearly unbridled discretion to 
interpret (and amend) the rules of the plan and decide 
eligibility for a pension.60 The Board’s decision was final “‘in 
the absence of fraud or such gross mistakes as imply bad faith 
or a failure to exercise an honest judgment.’ The burden of 
proof . . . was upon the appellant here, and, to sustain such a 
showing, the evidence ‘must be more than a mere 
preponderance, it must be overwhelming.’”61 
Courts occasionally achieved equity in individual cases of 
hardship through other legal theories while leaving the general 
practice of deference to employers in place. Section 90 of the 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts provides: 
 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forbearance [of a 
definite and substantial character] on the part of 
the promisee. . . and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.62 
 
58. Id. at 787-88. 
59. Id. at 790-92. 
60. Id. at 791 (“[T]he company only obligated itself to pension such 
employees as the Board of Pensions, in the fair exercise of the power 
conferred upon it, determined to be eligible to receive the benefits of the 
plan.”). 
61. Id. (internal citations omitted); see Dowling v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 
80 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (denying appellant a pension after 
he worked for his railroad employer for approximately thirty-four years 
because his voluntary separation of less than a year in the middle of his 
employment violated the plan’s eligibility terms even though he “never had a 
copy of the rules and regulations with reference to the pension”). 
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981). An example 
that the Restatement gives of the concept is: “A promises B to pay him an 
annuity during B’s life. B thereupon resigns a profitable employment, as A 
expected that he might. B receives the annuity for some years, in the 
meantime becoming disqualified from again obtaining good employment. A’s 
promise is binding.” Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 163-68 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1959). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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Courts relied on the quasi-contractual theories of promissory 
estoppel and unjust enrichment to temper the worst injustices 
visited upon individual pension claimants.63 Those theories 
were, however, applied narrowly and infrequently.64  
Even when courts utilized quasi-contractual theories to 
protect workers’ rights, the holdings were limited and did not 
affect the overwhelming legal bias in favor of employers. In 
Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., the court used unjust enrichment and 
quantum meruit to reject a harsh enforcement of the pension 
contract. 65 Lucas involved the purchase by Seagrave of another 
company’s assets and an assumption of its liabilities under a 
non-contributory pension plan.66 After consummating that 
transaction, Seagrave terminated 30 of the 65 employees of the 
company it acquired.67 The plaintiffs (terminated employees) 
contended that Seagrave terminated them to avoid making 
future contributions to the pension plan since forfeited pension 
credits could be used to cover those obligations.68 
The plaintiffs in Lucas alleged that the accrued pension 
contributions were compensation for services already rendered, 
 
63. West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 225 P.2d 978, 982-83 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1951) (holding that repeated promises made by management to the plaintiff 
that confirmed he would receive a pension according to the company’s 
customary policy as he understood it may state a claim for promissory 
estoppel where they induced him to remain on the job – even though the 
plaintiff’s understanding of the company’s policy was incorrect); Hunter, 197 
P.2d at 815-16 (finding in plaintiff’s favor where he retired and received 
roughly half of his promised pension because even if a contract had not 
existed, the gift would be enforceable under the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel since the plaintiff knew about the pension promise and rejected 
other offers of employment in reliance on the promise of a future pension). 
64. Hughes, 117 N.E.2d at 883 (holding that the employer’s pension plan 
constituted an unenforceable gratuity and rejecting plaintiff’s theory of 
promissory estoppel because “there is no fraud, no intent to deceive and no 
detrimental change of position” by the employee); Sbrogna v. Worcester 
Stamped Metal Co., 234 N.E.2d 749 (Mass. 1968) (denying claim of unjust 
enrichment where all of the plaintiffs’ previously-purchased retirement 
annuities were cancelled by the defendant employer when they went on 
strike after the expiration of their union’s collective bargaining agreement 
with the employer). 
65. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 344 (D. Minn. 1967). 
66. Id. at 340. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
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and they were therefore entitled to recover the value even if 
they did not meet the terms of the pension contract.69 Although 
the court discussed how participants generally did not have 
vested pension rights unless they had strictly met the terms of 
the plan, the court “found no decision which has ruled directly 
on the assertion of a quasi-contractual right of recovery of 
pension benefits on the basis that such benefits are essentially 
a form of compensation.”70 Instead, relying on cases about 
collective bargaining agreements where pensions were held to 
be a component of wages, the court found that as an employee 
approaches retirement age, pension accruals “may even 
overshadow his cash wages as consideration for his services.”71 
Although noting that “present decisions apparently give no 
weight or recognition to the existing and accepted 
characteristic of pension plans as a mode of employee 
compensation,” the court found theory rooted in quasi-contract 
for protecting these workers terminated by an employer 
allegedly attempting to avoid its obligations while retaining the 
value of the unpaid services of the workers.72 
While the Lucas case may seem to be an example of 
judicial activism at its best, the procedural posture of the case 
is a motion for summary judgment.73 Thus, in the end, all the 
court does is to deny defendant’s motion and allow that 
plaintiffs in such an egregious set of circumstances may have a 
claim in quasi-contract if they can develop the facts to support 
their theories—a difficult endeavor.74 More importantly, the 
plaintiffs must prove that the employer acted in bad faith by 
terminating the employees because simply dismissing an 
employee nearing retirement who had not yet vested in his 
pension rights would not be actionable. The employee was 
found to have assumed such a risk.75 As the court stated: 
 
 
69. Id. at 339-40. 
70. Id. at 343. 
71. Lucas, 277 F. Supp. at 343. 
72. Id. at 344-45. 
73. Id. at 339. 
74. Id. at 346 (“At this stage of the record it is not clear whether the 
facts of the instant case justify such a recovery.”) 
75. Id. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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[I]t seems harsh to assert that employees assume 
knowingly the risk of all contingencies which 
might prevent their recovery of benefits; as if the 
plan were a negotiated contract agreed upon 
through arm’s length bargaining. It hardly seems 
equitable to apply the literal contract language, 
which may not have been inserted to cover such a 
situation, to uncritically rule that employees 
bear the risk of a group termination which may 
not have been contemplated by the contract or 
the actuarial expectations upon which the plan is 
funded. Such a literal enforcement of plan 
provisions may defeat rather than foster plan 
purposes. This approach seems particularly 
unjustifiable where there may be indications of 
bad faith or where the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment is invoked.76 
 
Thus, even after courts acknowledged that employees had 
contractual rights with respect to pension promises, few courts 
were willing to deviate from enforcing strictly contracts written 
and enforced by employers to meet their needs—leaving 
workers with little recourse.77 As two law students presciently 
 
76. Id.; James E. Coleman & Jonathan Herlands, Private Pension Plans: 
The Prospects for Reform, 5 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 465, 477-78 (1973). 
77. Some advocates for pension reform in the years leading up to the 
passage of ERISA argued that courts should use a theory of deferred wages to 
adjudicate pension disputes. The germs of the theory can be seen in the Lucas 
case discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 65-76, but are 
fundamentally derived from cases holding that pensions are considered 
wages for the purpose of collective bargaining. See generally Inland Steel Co. 
v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 
(“While, as the Company has demonstrated, a reasonable argument can be 
made that the benefits flowing from such a plan are not ‘wages,’ we think the 
better and more logical argument is on the other side, and certainly there is, 
in our opinion, no sound basis for an argument that such a plan is not clearly 
included in the phrase, ‘other conditions of employment.’”). The deferred 
wages theory holds that when an employer contributes to a pension plan on 
an employee’s behalf, these contributions are wages withheld and the 
employee’s property. Comment, Consideration for the Employer’s Promise of a 
Voluntary Pension Plan, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 96, 102 (1955). As a result, the 
employee’s right to the funds vests immediately when they are withheld, and 
he does not forfeit this property even if terminated for cause. Id. at 103; 
17
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wrote in a journal article on the eve of ERISA’s passage: 
 
In view of the many possible ways employees can 
lose their benefits, it would seem logical and 
desirable as a matter of public policy for the 
courts to strive to safeguard the rights of pension 
plan participants. . . . [T]he courts have not 
attempted to achieve this aim. . . . [T]he courts’ 
strict interpretation of pension plans, the paucity 
of available legal theories to support recoveries 
by employees, and the hesitancy of the courts to 
utilize those few theories that have been 
accepted, have vitiated the potential of the 
judiciary to champion workers’ rights and 
institute reform.78 
 
III. The Triumph of ERISA’s Private Litigation Remedy 
 
While struggling over the details of pension reform, 
Congress sought to regulate a field dominated by the private 
actors who had administered pension plans for decades without 
significant government intervention. Proposed legislation left 
 
Coleman & Herlands, supra note 76, at 478-79 (quoting Senator Williams: 
“Pensions are not gratuities, but earnings saved and deferred to retirement. 
They represent compensation which the employee would have received in his 
paycheck had he not belonged to a pension plan.” ). While many argue that a 
theory of deferred wages presents itself in the cases under the contractual 
framework because deferred wages form a basis for finding the consideration 
necessary for contract formation, this theory takes a leap to immediate 
vesting not found in the case law. 
  The theory of deferred wages does have its problems, although it at least 
respects the importance of pension promises. First, when focusing on the 
defined benefit plans more prevalent at this time, pension benefits are based 
on a formula that emphasizes earnings late in a career and years of service – 
reducing the value of pension benefits accrued for much of an employee’s 
earlier service and stacking the deck for work in later years. Id. at 467. 
Second, the goal of private pensions is to help workers maintain quality of life 
during retirement. Id. at 479. Treating pension accruals as wages may result 
in a feeling that employees should have the right to spend the money now 
instead of engaging in the always difficult process of delayed gratification. Id. 
Pension portability would help solve the temptation to treat deferred wages 
as current wages, however. Id. at 467, 479. 
78. Coleman & Herlands, supra note 76, at 474. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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the task of daily administration of private pensions to 
employers and their representatives.79 Any legislation 
requiring employers to fund pension plans with no control over 
who would receive a pension, when, and for how much would 
discourage the formation or maintenance of these voluntary 
plans.80 
Given the extent of the authority it was delegating to 
employers as fiduciaries, Congress faced an important question 
when deciding who would enforce the bargain reached to better 
protect workers against abuses: (1) the bureaucracy—and if so, 
which agency, or (2) the courts. In the end, Congress split 
regulatory authority between the Department of Labor (“DOL”) 
and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to resolve conflict 
between congressional committees, bureaucratic agencies, and 
interest groups.81 The result was overlap, confusion, and 
inefficiency, which left the bulk of the ERISA enforcement 
responsibilities to the courts and to the participants themselves 
who would initiate lawsuits in the absence of bureaucratic 
enforcement.82 
 
A. The Death of the Single Agency Proposal 
 
In his congressional testimony discussed above, Frank 
Cummings argued that because pension rights were litigated 
rarely as a result of the large costs involved and the small 
potential recovery, “you need an agency to enforce these private 
rights, or a union.”83 But which agency? The Department of 
 
79. See generally Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 138 (statement of Frank Cummings). Cummings asserted that 
the Internal Revenue Service could not be an enforcement agency because: 
 
[i]t isn’t equipped to enforce private rights. Only the Labor 
Department is, which, after all, enforces private rights all 
the time. For example, if you don’t pay time and one-half for 
overtime, you go to the Labor Department and the Labor 
Department says “do it” and it goes into the court and the 
judge says “do it.” So, if you want to protect private rights, 
you have to create private rights and you have to create an 
19
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Commerce was viewed as favorable to business, while the 
Department of Labor supposedly sided with workers. 84 The 
Internal Revenue Service already helped regulate the tax 
qualification of pension plans.85 
The debate over where to place enforcement authority 
within the bureaucracy embroiled congressmen, their 
committees, and their business and labor constituencies for 
years.86 Their inability to agree on where to locate enforcement 
duties doomed the proposal of a single, powerful agency 
regulating private pensions and consequently enhanced the 
significance of the private litigation remedy.87 
When Senator Javits introduced the first comprehensive 
bill for pension reform, the Pension and Employee Benefit Act 
of 1967, he proposed a single agency with oversight—”an 
independent commission that would have jurisdiction over the 
new regulations as well as most existing federal oversight of 
employee benefit plans.”88 Drawing on recent pension 
 
agency that will enforce those private rights. 
 
Id. at 139. 
84. While unions and the Democrats who traditionally represented them 
favored enforcement by the DOL, employers favored the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or Internal Revenue Service since the Department of 
Commerce lacked expertise in the area. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE 
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 47 (2004). 
85. Id. at 45. 
86. Id. at 45-49. 
87. Controversy over which part of the bureaucracy should have 
oversight of pension regulation began in the decades prior to ERISA’s 
enactment as momentum for pension reform built. Legislation to force 
increased and more accurate disclosure from plans was gutted prior to 
passage because of disagreement over the location and extent of enforcement 
powers. An Eisenhower bill from January 1956 required pension plans to 
report to the DOL, the traditional regulators of the employment relationship. 
The Douglas-Ives-Murray bill introduced in May 1956 in the Senate, 
however, provided that pension plans would register and file reports with the 
SEC. Employees would receive summaries of plan terms, and the SEC could 
penalize incomplete or inaccurate disclosure with fines or imprisonment. In 
the end, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 placed 
oversight within the DOL but denied automatic disclosure to employees and 
eliminated penalties for false statements, omissions, and even embezzlement. 
Thus, the legislation denied the DOL “the investigative and enforcement 
authority it would need to implement the law.” Id., at 45-49, 121-22. 
88. Id. at 129-30. Senator Williams also called in February 1972 for “the 
centralization in one agency of all existing as well as prospective regulation of 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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legislation in Ontario,89 Javits’ “United States Pension and 
Employee Benefit Plan Commission” would have included five 
members appointed by the President with the advice and 
counsel of the Senate.90 Among the duties of the Commission 
were “to promote the establishment, extension, and 
improvement” of pension plans and to register or decline to 
register plans.91 As part of those duties, the Commission had 
the power to inspect the books and records of pension plans and 
broadly “to require any such administrator, employer, insurer, 
trustee, or other person to furnish, in a form acceptable to the 
Commission, such information as the Commission deems 
necessary for the purpose of ascertaining whether this Act and 
regulations of the Commission hereunder have been or are 
being complied with.”92 
Although those working on pension reform had assumed 
that all vesting, funding, and termination insurance proposals 
would amend the tax code, Javits and his staff placed all 
elements of his bill under the labor laws to avoid the powerful 
and hostile House Ways and Means Committee and instead 
give jurisdiction to the Senate Labor Committee.93 Thus began 
a lengthy battle between congressional committees with 
jurisdiction over labor matters and those supervising 
taxation.94 The single agency proposal fell victim to the 
jurisdictional dispute.95 
As soon as Javits proposed a single agency to administer 
pension reform, opposition to the idea arose. A memorandum 
 
private pension plans.” Id. at 177. 
89. See Province of Ontario, Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1 1965 (Can.); 
Letter from Allen E. Kaye to Frank Cummings (Mar. 7, 1966) (on file with 
Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections, Stony Brook 
University Libraries); Letter from R. M. Gaby to Allen E. Kaye (Mar. 21, 
1966) (on file with Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections, 
Stony Brook University Libraries); Letter from Laurence E. Coward to Allen 
E. Kaye (Mar. 24, 1966) (on file with Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, 
Special Collections, Stony Brook University Libraries). 
90. Pension and Employee Benefit Act of 1967, S. 1103, 90th CONG.        
§ 3(a) (1st Sess. 1967). 
91. S. 1103 at § 4(a). 
92. Id. at § 4(b). 
93. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 129-31. 
94. See generally id. at 130-180. 
95. Id. at 178. 
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from the Bureau of the Budget (“BOB Memo”) dated September 
8, 1967 explains why even without “thorough study” of current 
and prospective pension regulation, “[i]t does not appear 
feasible to vest all functions relating to pension plans in a 
single agency” and “[i]t does not appear feasible to vest the new 
functions, or the existing functions which may be separable, in 
a new agency.”96 The BOB Memo argued that a single agency 
was unworkable because pension functions already performed 
by existing agencies were tied to their core missions.97 For 
example, the IRS determination of qualification for tax 
deductions was related to basic tax administration.98 
“Similarly, Labor’s functions with respect to bargaining rights 
and overtime rate computations with respect to pension plans 
do not appear separable from its broader role in those areas.”99 
No explanation of why these tasks could not be performed by a 
different agency is given. 
The BOB Memo finds problems with creating an 
independent agency to administer and enforce pension 
regulation—or as much as can be separated from existing 
agencies: 
 
Such an agency, even with the broadest possible 
program now envisioned, would be small and 
isolated from the major policy-making agencies of 
Government. It would have little chance of access 
to the President, and problems could develop in 
trying to develop its programs in the context of 
related programs affecting the labor force and 
income maintenance in other agencies.100 
 
The Johnson administration task force considering pension 
reform opposed bureaucratic consolidation for practical 
 
96. Memorandum from the Exec. Office of the President, Bureau of the 
Budget, Howard Schnoor for Mr. March on Organization For Private Pension 
Plan Program (Sept. 8, 1967) (on file with the Senator Jacob K. Javits 
Collection, Special Collections, Stony Brook University Libraries). 
97. See generally, id. 
98. Id. at 2. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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reasons.101 Representative Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, opposed many of the reforms 
proposed.102 Focusing on substantive reforms in areas such as 
vesting and funding, the task force wanted to avoid Mills by 
drafting a bill under the jurisdiction of labor committees in 
Congress and enforced by the DOL.103 This made consolidation 
of the IRS’ current pension duties impossible at the time 
(although Mills and congressional tax committees later become 
involved in pension reform).104 
For the next several years, Javits continued to push for a 
single agency to enforce ERISA within the bureaucracy. On 
May 14, 1969, he again introduced legislation that sought to 
“establish an SEC-style agency” that would have oversight of 
new pension standards and “any existing regulatory standards 
dealing with pension and welfare plans that now rest in other 
Federal agencies.”105 Recognizing the deep divisions even 
among those involved within the pension reform movement, 
Javits hedged: “I do not, however, claim that this bill 
represents the only way of dealing with problems in the 
pension field; there are other approaches which can and should 
be explored.”106 
Further study of the structure of pension regulation 
emphasized the political difficulties of consolidating 
enforcement within a single agency while acknowledging its 
benefits. The Secretaries of Labor and Commerce on April 14, 
1969 charged a Joint Task Force with reviewing the “‘security’ 
issues of vesting, funding, insurance and portability.”107 The 
 
101. STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 212-13 (1997). 
102. Id. at 212. 
103. Id 
104. Id. at 212-13. 
105. Press Release, Office of Senator Jacob K. Javits, Javits Seeks SEC-
Type Agency to Oversee $100-Billion Private Pension Plans; Bill Protects 
Against Last-Minute Pension Forfeiture After Long Service (May 14, 1969) 
(on file with the Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections, Stony 
Brook University Libraries). 
106. Id. 
107. JOINT LABOR/COMMERCE TASK FORCE, 91ST CONG., REP. ON REVIEW 
OF PENSION SECURITY ISSUES AND OPTIONS (on file with the Senator Jacob K. 
Javits Collection, Special Collections, Stony Brook University Libraries). 
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Task Force included in its resulting report a chapter that 
examined potential routes of administration and enforcement 
for pension reform legislation.108 Specifically, it looked at the 
questions: (1) “Should all pension plan activities of the Federal 
government be vested in a single agency?” and (2) “Assuming 
that pension regulatory functions should be consolidated in a 
single agency, should that agency constitute a new independent 
regulatory agency?”109 
The Task Force concluded that a single agency should 
administer and enforce all pension regulation.110 Among the 
benefits of the single agency concept noted were easing the 
burden on employers administering pension plans, reducing 
duplication, and achieving coordinated pension policy to 
safeguard pensions while also encouraging the expansion of 
private pension plans.111 “A single agency, possessed of all the 
expertise and experience available, would be able to focus in 
the most efficient and flexible way on the complex and dynamic 
aspects of the private pension system.”112 
The Task Force acknowledged that the real question was 
not whether the federal government’s regulation of pensions 
should be consolidated in a single agency but instead whether 
such an action was “feasible.”113 Jurisdiction over pension 
issues was already fragmented because it involved the IRS, 
DOL, SEC, National Labor Relations Board, Department of 
Justice, and assorted other agencies applying their rules to 
pension plans.114 It might not be possible to avoid IRS and 
 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. REP. ON REVIEW OF PENSION SECURITY ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra 
note 107. The report notes that current jurisdiction included: (1) the IRS 
management of tax qualification of plans and employer deductions; (2) the 
DOL enforcement of wage and hour laws that are affected by pension credits 
and gathering of labor statistics; (3) the SEC’s application of rules to plan 
investments and information gathering on the same; (4) the NLRB’s 
oversight of the Taft Hartley’s provisions on whether pension plans penalize 
union members and are fairly bargained; (5) the enforcement by the DOJ of a 
section of the Taft Hartley Act dealing with improper use of benefit funds for 
purposes not benefiting employees; and (6) the application of EEOC, HUD, 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) interaction with 
pension plans, for example, because their missions touched on 
the conduct of plans (as the BOB Memo had noted).115 If all 
pension matters could not be brought under one roof, the 
benefits of consolidation could not be fully achieved.116 
Most of the DOL’s pension functions, such as enforcement 
of disclosure standards,117 were found capable of transfer and 
consolidation, but it was more difficult to transfer all IRS 
duties to another agency. Functions such as determinations 
that plans met qualification standards and the gathering of 
data on pension plans could be consolidated, but concerns of 
tax evasion, discrimination by pension plans in favor of highly 
compensated employees, and allowable deductions by 
employers and exclusions of trust income from taxation by 
pension plans related to the IRS’ tax policy mission.118 The 
report concluded that “centralization to the maximum feasible 
extent” was still worthwhile given the benefits that would 
result. 119 
The Task Force then considered which agency should 
administer and enforce pension regulation—an existing agency 
 
and DOD regulations to benefit plans. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. The report cites Javits’ seeming concern over the difficulties of 
implementing a single agency proposal: 
 
It may be that the entire scope of Treasury operations 
affecting pension plans should be transferred to the 
Commission. And yet, such determinations as the manner of 
integrating pension benefits with social security benefits 
and the determination of reasonable levels of compensation 
obviously have an important impact on Federal revenue 
considerations. Similarly, the extent to which regulations of 
pension plan investments is now performed by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission warrants careful 
consideration as to what functions, if any, should be 
transferred to the proposed Commission. 
 
Id. (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 4653 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits)). 
117. Id. 
118. REP. ON REVIEW OF PENSION SECURITY ISSUES AND Options, supra 
note 107. The need for the Secretary of Labor to use the value of employee 
benefits as a component in the prevailing wage rates used to set the 
minimum wages was not readily subject to consolidation, though. Id. 
119. Id. 
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and, if so, which one, or a new, independent agency.120 
Although the IRS was perhaps the best qualified to handle 
complex pension matters, “the public interest factor [of pension 
reform] transcends revenue considerations.”121 At the SEC, the 
mission to regulate securities might force labor and pension 
issues to a subsidiary role despite the SEC’s experience 
handling disclosure, investments, and fiduciary law. While 
pension regulation did not clash with any preexisting core 
agency mission at the DOL, the report noted correctly that a 
decision to consolidate regulation at the DOL would result in 
backlash from employers.122 
Uncertain which existing agency should have primary 
responsibility for pensions, the Task Force addressed the 
advantages and disadvantages of creating a new, independent 
body.123 Although independent agencies are typically thought to 
have greater political independence from the President (and 
thus have greater continuity of staffing at high levels), be more 
bipartisan, and be more efficient since they are focused on the 
statute they administer, the Task Force found no clear support 
for these supposed advantages. Similarly, the evidence was 
inconclusive on the supposed disadvantages of independent 
agencies, including that the President cannot control them or 
coordinate their policies, they are more readily subject to 
capture by the industries they regulate, and they have trouble 
juggling administration and enforcement with long-term policy 
coordination. The Task Force concluded by refusing to take a 
position on whether consolidation within an existing agency or 
the creation of a new agency was preferable, noting that 
political factors should influence the choice.124 The fact that 
this group agreed that consolidation within a single agency was 
best but could not agree on which agency should have primary 
power to administer and enforce pension laws indicates how 
sensitive the issue was and how difficult the task of 
consolidation would be. 
 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. REP. ON REVIEW OF PENSION SECURITY ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra 
note 107. 
124. Id. 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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Ironically, however, labor put the final nail in the coffin of 
Javits’ proposal for an independent agency with oversight of 
pension regulation. Javits attempted to gain the support of 
labor by placing that independent agency within the DOL in a 
draft bill proposed in February 1972.125 He did this in spite of 
arguing earlier that his U.S. Pension and Employee Benefit 
Commission, should have jurisdiction over pension regulation 
(including tax qualification) instead of the Department of 
Labor.126 The AFL-CIO, however, rejected his proposal.127 After 
years of government scrutiny of labor actions, including 
hearings focusing on pension misdeeds by union leaders, the 
organization did not want to empower another government 
agency to investigate unions.128 If any agency was to have such 
power, it would need to be the DOL—the traditional friend of 
labor—not an independent and unknown power within that 
agency.129 
Javits was forced to advocate instead for consolidation of 
pension regulation within the DOL instead of an independent 
agency. Cummings’ congressional testimony is illustrative of 
Javits’ position that an independent commission was best but 
given the lack of support for that idea, the DOL should manage 
as much ERISA enforcement as possible.130 Cummings argued 
that an independent, SEC-like commission was the best answer 
for pension reform (as he helped Javits argue for years) 
because it could consolidate pension expertise and place all 
 
125. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 178. 
126. See Pension & Welfare Plans: Hearing on S. 3421, S. 1024, S.1103, 
and S. 1255 Before: the S. Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and 
Pub. Welfare, 90th CONG. 122 (1968) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits) (“I 
think that the question of whether the Commission should run it or the 
Secretary of Labor should run it is a substantive difference, perhaps of a 
major character.”). 
127. WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 178 (“Labor leaders ‘feel they must have 
‘their man’ in the Cabinet to protect them against the possibilities of extreme 
action . . . .’ The same concern led the AFL-CIO to demand Labor Department 
oversight of pension regulation. An ‘independent agency . . . housed at the 
[DOL]’ would not do. The idea had to go and did.”). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 223-27 (1973) 
(statement of Frank Cummings). 
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regulation under one agency for “one-stop service.”131 His key 
point here is the importance of consolidating all pension 
expertise in one agency to strengthen bureaucratic regulation: 
 
If the pension thrust of the IRS really has such 
extensive expertise, there is no reason why the 
personnel of that branch could not be 
transferred, en masse, to such a commission. If 
there is expertise in the Bureau of the Labor 
Department which now administers the 
Disclosure Act, the personnel of that branch 
could be transferred there, to such a 
Commission. With a corps of personnel like that, 
drawn from the IRS, the Labor Department, and 
perhaps also from the SEC, the Justice 
Department and from State Agencies preempted 
by federal law, I would doubt very much that any 
great additional bureaucracy would be needed.132 
 
The same results could not be achieved merely by 
consolidating such expertise within an existing agency such as 
the IRS or DOL because they were already devoted to their 
core missions and would not devote the same attention and 
resources to pension regulation.133 
Yet, given that “no one seemed interested” during the 
years Javits pushed for the independent commission and there 
was “no evidence of increasing interest in it now,” any 
consolidation of pension regulation needed to take place within 
the IRS or DOL.134 Only the DOL was qualified to respond to 
employee complaints since the IRS—not used to responding to 
complaints from workers—offered merely the remedy of tax 
penalties or disqualification for the pension plan. This would 
present the employee the equivalent remedy of cutting off one’s 
nose to spite one’s face since the plan would then be less able to 
 
131. REP. ON REVIEW OF PENSION SECURITY ISSUES AND Options, supra 
note 107. 
132. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 223-27 (1973) 
(statement of Frank Cummings). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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pay the employee pension benefits because its assets would be 
diminished by increased taxes on earnings and tax penalties.135 
This left the DOL as the best of the “half-loaf” options.136 
Congressional hearings held immediately prior to the 
passage of ERISA indicate the ongoing dispute over regulatory 
jurisdiction. Senator Javits and other reform advocates 
affiliated with congressional labor committees as well as 
unions137 thought the DOL should have as large a role as 
 
135. Id. (“The IRS is not essentially an investigating and enforcing 
agency. . . . Indeed, if a pension participant were to go to the IRS and 
complain . . . he would only be cutting his own throat. The most he could 
accomplish would be to disqualify the plan, and if he did so, he would be, in 
effect, reducing his own pension.”). 
136. Influential pension scholar Merton Bernstein argued against “half-
loaf” pension reform as “legislation that is inadequate and less than can be 
attained.” Second Panel Discussion on Private Pension Plan Reform, Vesting 
and Funding Provisions; Termination Insurance; Portability; and Fiduciary 
Standards: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on Private 
Pension Plans, 93d CONG. 828 (1973) (statement of Merton Bernstein).  
Rebutting the argument that the legislation could be enhanced in the future, 
he asserted, “Pension reform factors are approaching a critical mass. Once 
legislation results, that mass will be dissipated.” Id. 
137. Testimony by union representatives for the United Steelworkers of 
America and the United Auto Workers shows that they preferred jurisdiction 
within the DOL to the IRS. Similarly, a summary of AFL-CIO testimony 
provides that it: 
 
Urges that the [DOL] administer the pension plan 
requirements, as in S. 4. Considers pension plans to be an 
integral part of the collective bargaining process. Suggests 
that placing the administration in an agency whose primary 
interest is in collection of taxes may place the agency in a 
conflict-of-interest situation in relation to policing any 
funding standard because the more rapidly a pension plan 
funds, the less it pays in taxes. Maintains that regulatory 
supervision under the IRS hinges on an employer’s self 
interest in obtaining tax deductions. Feels that this is a very 
weak enforcement mechanism from the viewpoint of the 
beneficiaries. Considers possible IRS solutions to 
noncompliance to not really protect the interests of 
beneficiaries because if the plan’s tax exemption is removed 
or the plan terminated, this does not help the beneficiaries. 
 
Asserts that better administration would occur if a single 
agency were to be responsible for both enforcement and 
reporting. 
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possible.138 Employers, their interest groups, and members of 
congressional tax committees favored primary IRS jurisdiction 
because they viewed the DOL as biased in favor of employees. 
The testimony of Senators Javits and Williams before the 
Senate Finance Committee’s Subcommittee on Private Pension 
Plans shows not only the ongoing jurisdictional dispute over 
pension regulation within the Senate but also how Javits and 
Williams hedged and left the door open for significant IRS 
involvement because it was politically expedient.139 Senator 
Javits stated that employers’ primary motivation for 
maintaining pension plans is to improve employee morale and 
“employee relations,” elements of the DOL’s mission140 Among 
the other reasons cited why IRS administration was 
inappropriate was that half of pension plans were collectively 
bargained, tax penalties were insufficient, only the DOL 
 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 93d CONG., DIG. OF 
TESTIMONY ON PROPOSALS FOR PRIVATE PENSION PLAN REFORM 37 (Comm. 
Print 1973). 
138. A summary of testimony on the proper administering agency and 
enforcement for pension legislation shows that the American Bankers 
Association and the Chamber of Commerce believed that the IRS should have 
jurisdiction because of its expertise and impartiality. Interestingly, the 
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) felt that “regulatory functions 
in the pension area performed by the various departments and agencies of 
government should continue under their respective jurisdictions and should 
not be centralized in one agency, thus preserving the technical expertise 
required.” Id. at 38. Perhaps not incidentally, the NAM’s position was also 
likely to (and did in fact) continue the existing inefficiency and uncoordinated 
regulation of pension promises. 
139. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 278-86 
(remarks of Sen. Javits and Sen. Williams). 
140. Id. at 284. Senator Williams added, 
 
Now it just seems to me that we have reached a point where 
pension legislation most clearly falls within the state 
purpose in the law of the [DOL] as a Department “to foster, 
promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the 
United States and to improve their working conditions and 
to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.” 
This is intimately part of the job of benefit protection and, 
historically, that part of the workers’ arrangement with his 
employer has been watched over under law and regulation 
by the [DOL]. 
 
Id. at 283. 
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jurisdiction would provide the necessary preemption of state 
law to ensure coordinated policy, and—most importantly—that 
the primary mission of the IRS is collecting revenue through 
taxes and pension regulation would suffer from the IRS’ need 
to focus on its core mission.141 
When members of the Senate Finance Committee 
questioned Javits and Williams as to whether they believed 
that there was any role for the IRS in pension regulation, they 
relented and agreed to some form of IRS involvement. As Javits 
said “[a]gain . . . this doesn’t denigrate the interests of the tax 
authorities nor their interest in the deductions which are taken 
for payment to pension plans. They have a vital interest. We 
don’t challenge that at all.”142 When trying to define exactly the 
ongoing role that they foresaw for the IRS in pension 
regulation, however, Senators Javits and Williams ran into 
trouble. As Senator Williams admitted, “this is not finally 
formed in my mind”—even after many years of work on the 
issue.143 Senator Javits added that the IRS would have a role in 
determining reasonableness of compensation for purposes of 
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees as 
well as enforcing eligibility and vesting standards “for tax 
 
141. Id. at 282. 
 
Senator, we believe very strongly that the weight of 
administrative judgment is for administration in the Labor 
Department because, while you are absolutely right about 
the fact that IRS is doing more than they did, the fact is 
that it is still their primary jurisdiction to collect taxes and 
punish evasion and define people who evade. This 
represents such an enormous range in which they must 
operate, that pension plan supervision would only be one 
item. 
 
Id.; see WOOTEN, supra note 84, at 205 (explaining that it was uncertain 
whether the IRS’ implementation of the power to tax could include 
preemption of state pension regulation while the DOL’s control of the 
employment relationship through Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
commerce allowed for such preemption. 
142. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 278 (remarks 
of Sen. Javits and Sen. Williams). 
143. Private Pension Plan Reform, Part II, supra note 9, at 286 (remarks 
of Sen. Williams). 
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purposes only.”144 
Having conceded a necessary role for the IRS in areas like 
eligibility, vesting, and funding, Senators Javits and Williams 
then faced questions about the problem of dual—and 
potentially conflicting—jurisdiction in these areas if the DOL 
also regulated here.145 This is the question not fully resolved as 
the parties fought over jurisdiction and reached a compromise 
that involved duplication, overlap, and conflict. 
 
B. The Inability of the Bureaucracy to Enforce ERISA 
 
The administration and enforcement regime put in place 
under ERISA divides responsibility between the DOL and the 
Department of Treasury (mainly the IRS).146 Pensions 
historically fell within the purview of the IRS because they 
needed to be qualified for favorable tax treatment. As discussed 
above, however, the deferred wages theory of pensions also 
makes pension regulation part of the DOL’s mission. 
Turf battles within Congress and the bureaucracy resulted 
in the political compromise of overlapping—and frequently 
conflicting—jurisdiction.147 Indeed, even while the Conference 
Committee was resolving the final details of dual 
administration of ERISA by the DOL and IRS, many doubted 
that the statute could be effectively enforced in the planned 
manner. As staff members noted at one point, “While 
recognizing the staffs have made a valiant effort to resolve the 
jurisdictional problem, some staff members believe the 
 
144. Id. (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
145. Id. at 288. 
146. A newly created agency—the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation—also administers the statute’s insurance program, but its 
involvement is not relevant to this discussion. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra 
note 26, at 90. 
147. S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ERISA IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME 
SECURITY ACT OF 1974; THE FIRST DECADE 83 (Comm. Print 1984) (prepared by 
Beverly M. Klimkowsky) [hereinafter Klimkowsky] (“When President Ford 
signed ERISA into law on Labor Day 1974, the administrative apparatus 
charged with implementing the new law reflected the ambiguity concerning 
the proper jurisdictional sphere for the law and continued congressional 
rivalry over turf.”). 
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proposed solution falls short of eliminating the inevitable 
complexities, costs and inequities which will result from dual 
jurisdiction and enforcement.”148 
After the passage of ERISA, it quickly became clear that 
dual jurisdiction needed to be sorted out for the agencies to 
implement ERISA. The impracticalities of the IRS and DOL 
issuing regulations together slowed the process of 
implementation.149 By executive order, President Carter issued 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978.150 The IRS gained exclusive 
control over participation, vesting, and funding (among other 
areas), while the DOL governs fiduciary management and 
disclosure and prohibited transactions.151 The DOL and IRS 
also share control over decisions regarding whether a plan 
meets the exclusive benefit rule.152 This plan completed the 
transition away from the previous notion that the DOL would 
have primary control of pension regulation. 
Early conflicts within the DOL after ERISA’s passage also 
prevented effective administration and enforcement of 
fiduciary obligations. DOL leaders could not even agree on an 
internal structure for pension regulation. For three years and 
under five different administrators, the agency struggled with 
whether to house ERISA responsibilities under a new Assistant 
Secretary or under the existing Labor Management Services 
Administration that administered the Welfare and Pension 
Plan Disclosure Act but had other primary responsibilities. 
After three years, the DOL finally decided upon the Office of 
Pension Benefit Welfare Programs reporting to the Assistant 
Secretary for Labor Management Relations—at least for the 
moment.153 
Effective administration and enforcement of fiduciary 
responsibilities at the DOL was also hampered by the 
 
148. Staff Comments Relating to Jurisdictional Matters: Before Pension 
Reform Leg. House/Senate Conference on HR 2, 98th Cong. (1974) (on file 
with Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections, Stony Brook 
University Libraries). 
149. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 84. 
150. Exec. Order No. 12108, 44 F.R. 1065 (Jan. 3, 1979), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/exec_order_no4.html. 
151. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 95. 
152. Id.; LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 91. 
153. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 86-87. 
33
  
2014] A FAILURE TO SUPERVISE 249 
complexity of ERISA and the agency’s lack of resources.154 
Policy analyst Beverly Klimkowsky noted in a paper prepared 
for the Senate Special Committee on Aging on the tenth 
anniversary of ERISA: 
 
As one of the most complex laws Congress ever 
passed, ERISA suffers from having an unclear 
mandate. Multiple jurisdiction is a major 
example of congressional indecision being 
papered over and left to the administrators to 
sort out. Some of ERISA’s provisions (e.g., 
paperwork) are too specific, leaving 
administrators with little flexibility. Many other 
provisions were so vague that over 100 
regulations needed to be issued.155 
 
The DOL lacked financial and manpower resources 
initially to administer this complex statute.156 The IRS had 
many pension experts on staff already because of its previous 
work in the area, but the DOL lacked expertise and 
experienced higher turnover.157 
Although the Reorganization Plan allocated tasks more 
efficiently between the IRS and DOL and aided administration 
greatly, enforcement was still an issue of concern.158 The IRS 
and DOL maintained control over enforcement in their 
respective areas of ERISA, making coordinated pension policy 
difficult to achieve.159 The Secretary Labor has the power to file 
or intervene (in most circumstances) in civil lawsuits related to 
its areas of administration and also assess civil penalties.160 
The Secretary of Labor can also investigate conduct that may 
constitute a violation of ERISA’s title I by reviewing books and 
 
154. Id. at 87-88. 
155. Id. at 88. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 88-89, 93. 
158. Id. at 84, 98 (“ERISA enforcement constitutes the weakest link in 
implementation . . .”). 
159. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 95-97. 
160. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012); BLOOMBERG BNA EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS LAW § 3-14 (3d ed. 2012). 
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records and interviewing the relevant people where “reasonable 
cause” to believe there has been a violation exists or where the 
plan gives consent.161 No plan, however, can be forced to 
provide its books and records to the DOL more than once in a 
12 month period unless such “reasonable cause” to believe 
there has been a violation exists.162 The DOL engaged in few 
enforcement activities until a lengthy and involved matter with 
the Central State Teamsters Plan, and the DOL’s problems 
with internal organization left overall enforcement 
inadequate.163 
After a critical report by the General Accounting Office 
(“GAO”) in 1977, the DOL announced that it would use the 
significant case theory to guide its enforcement efforts—
requiring regional audits of large pension plans.164 The 
significant case theory was controversial, however.165 What 
constituted a large plan in one region might not in another.166 
In addition, the strategy left the many participants in small 
plans unprotected.167 The Solicitor’s Office was also 
overwhelmed and unable to respond to all proposed cases.168 
When Reagan took office, however, personnel at the DOL 
changed and the significant case strategy ended.169 Other 
strategies of emphasizing criminal cases and more centralized 
enforcement were attempted.170 
Since that time, reports on DOL enforcement of ERISA’s 
fiduciary provisions have routinely been critical.171 The GAO’s 
January 1989 report to the House Ways and Means 
 
161. ERISA § 504(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1134(a) (2012); see BLOOMBERG BNA 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 160, at § 3-13. 
162. ERISA § 504(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1134 (2012); see BLOOMBERG BNA 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 160, at § 3-13. 
163. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 97. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 97. 
170. Id. at 97-98. 
171. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-89-32, PENSION PLANS: 
LABOR AND IRS ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME 
SECURITY ACT (1989). 
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Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight found that the DOL’s 
enforcement efforts had a limited reach.172 By 1994, the GAO 
noted improvements made by the DOL in enforcement but still 
had substantial recommendations for change in its report 
entitled Pension Plans: Strong Labor ERISA Enforcement 
Should Better Protect Plan Participants.173 Of the 117 cases 
referred to the DOL Solicitor’s Office for civil litigation or to the 
Department of Justice for criminal litigation, only 38 lawsuits 
were filed.174 
Recent problems found with DOL ERISA enforcement 
include a lack of plan audits and resources for proper 
enforcement. After once again noting significant problems in 
2002, the GAO (which now stands for the Government 
Accountability Office) issued another report in January 2007 
finding protection of participants still inadequate.175 The DOL 
still did not have an accurate picture of ERISA noncompliance 
and therefore could not properly target its enforcement 
 
172. See id. at 2-4. During the period examined, fiscal years 1985 to 
1987, the DOL only closed roughly 1,300 pension plan investigations per 
year, though in 1987 there were an estimated 870,350 private pension plans. 
Id. Only one in four plans investigated were cited for ERISA violations, and 
the number was one in five for the first eight months of fiscal year 1988. Id. 
The DOL found 574 fiduciary violations in 1987. Id. 
173. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-157, PENSION PLANS: 
STRONGER LABOR ERISA ENFORCEMENT SHOULD BETTER PROTECT PLAN 
PARTICIPANTS 1-2 (1994). Area office enforcement staff had grown from 266 to 
365 between 1986 to 1993. Id. at 5. By program year 1993, the number of 
investigations closed was 2,998 (although 1,480 of these cases had been 
opened to test computer targeting programs that were still in the exploration 
stage). Id.  While the DOL managed to recover $183 million for plans and 
“impact” 72,199 plans and 21 million participants in 1993 with its focus on 
“significant issue” cases, only 303 cases resulted in a monetary recovery, only 
125 had fiduciary results (fiduciaries were removed, fiduciaries were forced to 
diversify plan investments or discontinue a particular investment, or other 
administrative practices were altered) and only 187 cases had non-fiduciary 
results (changes were made to comply with reporting and disclosure or 
bonding requirements). Id. at 5-6. 
174. Id. at 6. The report recommended reviewing the amount of 
resources focused on the “significant issue” strategy, focusing more on 
targeted computer programs, and increasing the use of penalties. Id. at 14-
15. 
175. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-22, EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS MADE BUT 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD FURTHER ENHANCE PENSION PLAN OVERSIGHT 
(2007). 
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efforts.176 The DOL did not conduct routine plan audits or risk 
assessments like other agencies and was focused on problems 
identified by plan sponsors, participants, or other agencies.177 
Finally, although it had recruited more skilled personnel 
needed to administer the complex statute, the DOL had a high 
attrition rate for related personnel.178 By fiscal year 2005, the 
DOL’s Office of the Solicitor litigated only 178 of the 258 
ERISA civil cases referred by the DOL’s Employee Benefit 
Security Administration (“EBSA”).179 As the report 
summarized: 
 
EBSA is a relatively small agency facing the 
daunting challenge of safeguarding the 
retirement assets of millions of American 
workers, retirees, and their families. . . . EBSA’s 
ability to protect plan participants against the 
misuse of pension plan assets is still limited, 
because its enforcement approach is not as 
comprehensive as those of other federal agencies, 
and generally focuses only on what it derives 
from its investigations.180 
 
The importance of enforcing ERISA’s fiduciary provisions 
is clear from ERISA’s legislative history.181 Yet Congress has 
never provided funding or authorization sufficient for the DOL 
to audit plans on a regular basis as the SEC and banking 
agencies do to enforce regulations in their sectors.182 Given the 
current economic climate and push for deficit reduction, it is 
highly unlikely that the executive agencies will soon be given 
 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 3. 
178. Id. at 2-4. The DOL’s Employee Benefits Security Administration 
(“EBSA”) had a ratio of personnel to regulated plans/entities of 1:8,000 as 
compared to 1:3,000 for the IRS and 1:9 for the SEC. Id. at 10. 
179. Formerly called the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration. 
Id. at 11. 
180. GAO-07-22, at 28. 
181. Beverly M. Klimkowsky & Ian D. Lanoff, ERISA Enforcement: 
Mandate for a Single Agency, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 89, 96-97 (1985). 
182. Id. at 97. 
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the resources necessary for proper enforcement.183 
Years after the passage of ERISA, there are still calls for a 
single agency to administer the statute and its amendments. 
As one article noted, “A review of fiduciary enforcement, in 
particular, indicates that the Department of Labor cannot 
enforce ERISA; the IRS does not enforce ERISA; and 
coordination in this area does not function well.”184 Its authors 
argued that the only hope for proper enforcement of the statute 
and coordinated policymaking was a single agency with 
jurisdiction over private pension regulation.185 
 
183. See Julius G. Getman, Public Policy Implications of ERISA, 68 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 473, 476 (1994) (“Complex statutes are inevitably difficult to 
enforce. Enforcement of a statute of this magnitude and complexity requires 
a major bureaucracy. The need for this type of bureaucracy, however, is 
arising at a time when public opinion is strongly opposed to governmental 
expansion. . . . It would be difficult to reconcile today’s hostility toward 
increasing bureaucracy with the need for the expanded bureaucracy required 
to enforce ERISA. Enforcing the statute selectively would create more 
complexity, confusion, and political resentment.”). 
184. Klimkowsky & Lanoff, supra note 181, at 90 (blaming problems 
with enforcing the statute on Congress for setting an “impossible task” of 
joint administration for the DOL and IRS). 
185. Id. at 91. 
 
As ERISA was written, DOL and the IRS shared 
responsibilities jointly, as opposed to having divided 
responsibilities, necessitating intensive coordination 
between the two agencies if the law was to be implemented. 
Because political compromise rather than ease of 
administration dictated the administrative structure of 
ERISA, severe management problems surfaced as soon as 
managers attempted to implement the new law. 
 
Id. at 94. But note the problems facing the idea of consolidation after ERISA’s 
enactment (many of which helped doom the idea initially): 
 
The structure and leadership of a new agency would be open 
to much debate and possible disagreement which could kill 
the idea entirely. It might not be possible to wrestle 
pensions away from the IRS entirely, since the issue 
remains very much a tax issue. Also, it is critical that 
interest be aroused on the Hill before anything can be 
accomplished. Few if any legislators have appeared to 
accept the mantle of leadership from ERISA’s founding 
fathers. 
 
Klimkowsky, supra note 147, at 101. 
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The current insufficient bureaucratic enforcement of 
ERISA has left private litigation as the main enforcement 
mechanism. Policy analyst Beverly Klimkowsky wrote on the 
tenth anniversary of ERISA that “ERISA implementation has 
not reached the mature stage of implementation in which the 
administering agencies act as powerful players in the policy 
process.”186 The same remains true today, and the courts have 
picked up the policymaking mantle. 
 
IV. Abdication or Delegation by the Judiciary After ERISA187 
 
ERISA provides for civil action by both plan participants 
and beneficiaries in addition to the Secretary of Labor. The 
statute created a private right of action as follows: 
 
A civil action may be brought—(1) by a 
participant or beneficiary—. . . (B) to recover 
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, 
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, 
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under 
the terms of the plan. . . . (3) by a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or 
practice which violates any provision of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to 
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any 
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the 
plan.188 
 
When creating private litigation remedies, Congress is 
aware that the courts may not always enforce the legislation as 
expected or desired.189 “It is in the nature of statutory 
 
186. Id. at 84 (noting that pension policy was largely being influenced by 
groups that do not regard “the fulfillment of the promise for a private pension 
as [their] sole or primary concern”). 
187. See McCubbins, supra note 13, at 13 (discussing the delegation of 
authority by Congress to the bureaucracy and its re-delegation). 
188. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
189. Work by political scientist Sean Farhang suggests that the presence 
of divided government – a Republican president and majority-Democrat 
39
  
2014] A FAILURE TO SUPERVISE 255 
interpretation that the interpreter, whether judicial or 
administrative, will frequently be called upon to make 
policy.”190 In the absence of strong bureaucratic enforcement of 
ERISA, however, the judiciary has become the central pension 
policymaking institution in the United States. Many legal 
scholars have argued that the courts have used this position in 
ways not intended by “ERISA’s language, legislative history, or 
purposes.”191 
When examining congressional delegation to bureaucratic 
agents, political scientist Mathew McCubbins noted conditions 
under which delegation fails and becomes abdication: 
 
Principals may lack an effective check because 
their agent has expertise that the principals do 
not possess or because of conflicting interests 
among the principals. Where delegation occurs 
under such conditions, agents may be free to take 
any action that suits them, regardless of the 
consequences for the principles. Delegation then 
becomes abdication.192 
 
In the case of pension regulation, Congress delegated 
authority over the administration of private pensions to 
fiduciaries.193 The courts were supposed to supervise that 
 
Congress – during the passage of ERISA likely influenced Congress’ decision 
to enact a private litigation remedy. Farhang studies the decision by 
Congress to develop private litigation remedies that effectively call on private 
individuals to enforce the statute passed through the courts. Over 90% of 
litigation enforcing statutes with private rights of action is litigated by a 
diverse group of individuals acting in their own interests but also carrying 
out a larger public service by enforcing the statute for all those affected. Sean 
Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation 
of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 821-23 (2008). 
190. Id. at 825 (internal citations omitted). See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, 
THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 7 (1977) (“The individual litigant, though still 
necessary, has tended to fade a bit into the background. Courts sometimes 
take off from the individual cases before them to the more general problem 
the cases call up, and indeed they may assume—dubiously—that the litigants 
before them typify the problem.”). 
191. Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 
4 (1992). 
192. McCubbins, supra note 13, at 37. 
193. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 649. 
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delegation through the private right of action, but they both 
lack the expertise necessary to control fiduciary administration 
and have conflicting interests in judicial efficiency.194 The 
result is judicial abdication in the enforcement of ERISA’s 
mission to safeguard benefit promises made to workers. 
The “‘vast majority of ERISA cases are simple benefit 
claim disputes in which a federal judge is reviewing the 
decision of a plan fiduciary.’”195 Under ERISA, making 
determinations of a participant or beneficiary’s benefits is a 
fiduciary function because “a person is a fiduciary with respect 
to the plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary 
authority or discretionary control respecting management of 
such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of its assets.”196 The courts are 
authorized to review such determinations because ERISA 
provides that a participant or beneficiary may sue “to recover 
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his 
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to 
future benefits under the terms of the plan.”197 Most pension 
participants or beneficiaries therefore seek the assistance of 
the courts to resolve benefit claims and are mainly concerned 
about fiduciary decisions that deny them all or part of the 
benefits to which they believe they are entitled. Because of this 
point, I will focus on how the courts have abdicated their role to 
supervise fiduciaries in deciding benefit claims, although the 
same can be said of many other ERISA claims decided by the 
courts.198 
While Congress intended for the courts to fill gaps in the 
statute and create common law to implement ERISA, many 
legal scholars argue that federal common law regarding ERISA 
 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii). 
197. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
198. Law Professor Jay Conison notes the importance of ERISA benefit 
claims and calls them the “bottom-line” of ERISA. In his view, benefit claims 
are first in ERISA’s hierarchy because “[u]nder ERISA, there is nothing else 
to protect.” Vesting, accrual, and funding standards, as well as remedial 
provisions for fiduciary breaches are all designed solely to ensure that 
participants and beneficiaries receive the benefits to which they are entitled. 
Conison, supra note 191, at 32-33. 
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benefit claims directly contradicts congressional intent.199 
 
A. Conflating Delegation to Private Actors with Delegation to 
Bureaucratic Actors 
 
The analogy of private fiduciaries to agency bureaucrats by 
federal courts reviewing the decisions of fiduciaries under 
ERISA demonstrates the blurring of the line between 
delegation to government officials and delegation to private 
actors.200 
In the landmark case of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Bruch, the Supreme Court ruled that the standard of review for 
courts reviewing an ERISA fiduciary’s administrative decision 
is de novo, meaning that the court should review all evidence 
without giving any deference to the fiduciary’s decision. 201 
However, the Court then created an enormous legal loophole 
that ERISA fiduciaries drove right through by holding that if 
the plan documents reserved the fiduciary’s right to exercise its 
discretion to determine benefit claims, then the fiduciary’s 
decision would be reviewed under the deferential “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard.202 This standard provides that unless 
the fiduciary’s decision was clearly arbitrary and capricious, 
then the court cannot overturn the original decision—even if 
the judge believes that another decision is proper. Bruch 
permits the exception to eat the rule since nearly all plans now 
contain reservations of rights that lead to the more lax 
standard of review. This arbitrary and capricious standard 
grants the same deference to ERISA fiduciaries as to decision-
makers in executive agencies.203 
 
199. See id. at 7. Conison also discusses legislative history that suggests 
Congress preempted state law on benefit claims as too restrictive because 
state courts “‘strictly interpret the plan indenture and are reluctant to apply 
concepts of equitable relief or to disregard technical document wording.’” Id. 
at 16. 
200. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The 
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials under 
ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1331-33 (2007), for a discussion of this 
analogy and a review of key cases. 
201. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 101 (1989). 
202. Id. at 109. 
203. Discussing the cases prior to Bruch that mandated an arbitrary and 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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Some courts have compared ERISA fiduciaries to executive 
branch administrators without fully acknowledging the 
implications of such an analogy. Judge Easterbrook from the 
Seventh Circuit, for example, compared administrators at a 
company that manages a large portion of disability benefit 
plans covered by ERISA (which applies to most disability and 
health benefit plans in addition to pension plans) to 
administrative law judges at the Social Security 
Administration who determine eligibility for Social Security 
disability benefits.204 In considering whether to apply the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review to UNUM Life 
Insurance Company in light of its interest in keeping costs 
down, the court noted that each benefit claim has little impact 
on a large company’s balance sheet, its employees do not 
necessarily share its self-interest, and its clients want to 
maintain good relationships with their employees and would 
not want benefit claims summarily denied.205 Adding to these 
factors that UNUM passes along the costs of benefit claims to 
employers (though imperfectly) through experience rating (i.e., 
increased employer costs to reimburse third parties 
administering benefit plans for retrospective benefit 
payments), the court concluded, “Thus we have no reason to 
 
capricious standard of review, Conison writes that “courts in ERISA cases 
appreciated the irony of applying an approach whose main effect was to 
facilitate defeat of benefit expectations. Because the approach was perceived 
as well established, however, courts were reluctant to make any substantial 
changes.” Conison, supra note 191, at 48. He then systematically undermines 
the Court’s attempt to justify deferential review through assumptions that 
benefit claims are a form of judicial review and that trust law governs such 
claims. Id. at 51-60. The focus, he argues, should instead be on whether 
benefit claims are decided correctly. Id.; see also Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: 
The Foundational Insufficiencies for Deferential Review in Employee Benefit 
Claims – Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 147, 197 (2009) (arguing that contract law and not trust law should 
govern ERISA benefit claims, making summary deferential judicial 
proceedings inappropriate). 
204. See Perlman v. Swiss Bank Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 
195 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have held that courts may treat 
welfare benefit plans just like administrative law judges implementing the 
Social Security disability-benefits program.”) (citations omitted); Langbein, 
supra note 200, at 1330-33. 
205. See Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981 (“We have no reason to think that 
UNUM’s benefits staff is any more ‘partial’ against applicants than are 
federal judges deciding income-tax cases.”). 
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think that the actual decisionmakers [sic] at UNUM 
approached their task any differently than do the decision-
makers at the Social Security Administration, and ordinarily 
deferential review is the order of the day.”206 
As Judge Wood noted in her dissent, however, the analogy 
between decision-making by ERISA fiduciaries and that of the 
Social Security Administration is improper because of a lack of 
safeguards to protect those whose benefits are in question.207 
She argued: 
 
Most importantly, the SSA is a public agency, 
whose decisions are subject to the strictures of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, while ERISA 
plan administrators are private sector actors 
subject to regulation under the ERISA statute. A 
host of federal constitutional rights and statutory 
rights combine to assure procedural regularity in 
the case of public agencies that are not available 
to those who attack private action.208 
 
 
 
206. Id.; see Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 
1985): 
 
While the [arbitrary and capricious] standard is perhaps 
more commonly associated with appellate court review of 
administrative findings, deference is likewise due when a 
district court reviews the action of a private plan trustee. 
Here, as in other contexts, the standard exists to ensure 
that administrative responsibility rests with those whose 
experience is daily and continual, not with judges whose 
exposure is episodic and occasional. 
 
Id. For an argument that Judge Easterbrook inappropriately combines 
“rulemaking” and “administrative adjudication” under a category of judicial 
deference to agencies that he terms “delegation,” see Daniel T. Bogan, Reply 
to Judge Easterbrook: The Unsupported Delegation of Conflict Adjudication 
in ERISA Benefit Claims under the Guise of Judicial Deference, 57 OKLA. L. 
REV. 21 (2004). Bogan argues that because Congress did not delegate the 
adjudicative function under ERISA to any executive agency, the function 
belongs with the federal courts and not private fiduciaries. Id. at 23-28. 
207. See Perlman, 195 F.3d at 985 (7th Cir. 1999) (Wood, J., dissenting). 
208. Id. 
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The absence of these procedural safeguards for ERISA 
fiduciaries deciding benefit claims makes the analogy of ERISA 
fiduciaries to agency decision-makers inappropriate.209 
ERISA’s required claims procedures, discussed further 
below, are insufficient in several ways when compared with the 
procedural safeguards available under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) and to Social Security claimants, for 
example. Within the Social Security Administration, an 
Administrative Law Judge presides over an administrative 
trial where the claimant can present evidence and subpoena 
and cross-examine witnesses. When federal courts hear an 
appeal, the claimant has already had an opportunity to be 
heard in the trial.210 Yet courts use the same arbitrary and 
capricious standard to review ERISA benefit claims even 
though participants have not been heard by a neutral decision-
maker, been permitted discovery or been able to cross-examine 
witnesses at trial.211 
Nor do ERISA fiduciaries necessarily have the expertise 
that agency administrators possess to justify greater 
deference.212 Fiduciaries, particularly executives of the 
employer appointed to help administer the plans and contain 
costs, frequently lack basic ERISA knowledge or legal or 
accounting training to prepare them for their duties.213 They 
may have no knowledge of legal rules of evidence or other 
procedures to make sure they have investigated benefit claims 
 
209. Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“The Social Security Administration is a public agency that denies benefits 
only after giving the applicant an opportunity for a full adjudicative hearing 
before a judicial officer, the administrative law judge. The procedural 
safeguards thus accorded, designed to assure a full and fair hearing, are 
missing from determinations by plan administrators.”); Mark D. DeBofsky, 
The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA Benefit Claims, 
37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727, 738-43 (2004); Langbein, supra note 200, at 
1332-33. 
210. Bogan, supra note 206, at 26-27. 
211. Id. at 28; DeBofsky, supra note 209, at 738-39 (“Although the 
ERISA claim regulations provide many of these guarantees, the most crucial 
protections are denied ERISA claimants. . . . Such claims are not presented to 
an unbiased tribunal; and claimants lack any opportunity to challenge 
adverse evidence through cross-examination.”). 
212. Bogan, supra note 206, at 26-27. 
213. Id. at 26. 
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sufficiently.214 
Under the APA, agency decisions made without the 
hallmarks of substantive or procedural due process are subject 
to de novo review by courts.215 Yet decisions by ERISA 
fiduciaries that lack such safeguards receive the same 
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review.216 
Other federal courts have also cautioned against the 
analogy between ERISA fiduciaries and executive agencies 
because of the conflict of interest that fiduciaries face between 
acting for the exclusive benefit of participants and to preserve 
the assets of employers funding pension plans or third parties 
insuring ERISA welfare plans. In Bruch, the Court 
acknowledged that “if a benefit plan gives discretion to an 
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of 
interest, that conflict must be weighed as a “‘facto[r] in 
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.’”217 Courts 
have been unsure how exactly conflicts should alter their 
review of benefit claims, and in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 
v. Glenn, the Supreme Court did not clarify its answer 
substantially.218 Instead, the Court reiterated that the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review applies when an 
employer or insurer decides benefit eligibility and also pays 
approved claims out of its own pocket.219 As a circuit court 
wrote regarding the problem of applying administrative law in 
the ERISA context: 
 
 
 
214. Id. 
215. DeBofsky, supra note 209, at 738-40. 
216. Id. 
217. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 
187, cmt. d (1959)). 
218. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008) 
(confirming that courts need to weigh different factors when reviewing 
benefit claims, and conflict of interest is only one, although it carries more 
weight “where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it affected the 
benefits decision” and less weight “where the administrator has taken active 
steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy”); see Kathryn J. 
Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1083 (2001); LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 665-669. 
219. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 108, 122. 
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Use of the administrative agency analogy may, 
ironically, give too much deference to ERISA 
fiduciaries. Decisions in the ERISA context 
involve the interpretation of contractual 
entitlements; they ‘are not discretionary in the 
sense, familiar from administrative law, of 
decisions that make policy under a broad grant of 
delegated powers.’ Moreover, the individuals who 
occupy the position of ERISA fiduciaries are less 
well-insulated from outside pressures than are 
decision-makers at government agencies.220 
 
This conflict of interest that occurs when an employer or 
insurer decides benefit eligibility and also pays approved 
claims out of its own pocket is one not typically faced by 
decision-makers at executive agencies.221 
Because of the lack of procedural safeguards and the 
conflicted nature of ERISA fiduciaries, the fiduciaries are 
supposed to be mere “interpreters of contractual 
entitlements.”222 Continuing to treat fiduciaries as bureaucrats, 
courts have instead required that participants and 
beneficiaries first pursue their claims through the ERISA 
plan’s internal grievance procedures (referred to as the 
 
220. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1564 n. 7 (internal citations omitted). 
221. To take a classic ERISA example, when an employer sponsors a 
defined benefit pension plan, the employer assumes the risk of paying a 
stated amount to workers and their beneficiaries in the future. If, for 
example, the stock market underperforms and the money set aside by the 
employer is insufficient to pay the required pension, the employer will need 
to contribute more money. If, on the other hand, the employer can find a way 
to deny a claim for pension benefits, then the employer will not have to 
contribute as much to the pension plan. Benefit claims therefore directly 
affect the employer’s finances, and because high-level employees or third 
parties hired by the employer administer pension plans and owe their 
employment to the plan sponsor, the employees and third parties have a 
conflict of interest when deciding benefit claims. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra 
note 26, at 652-53 (noting that “because ERISA § 408(c)(3) allows 
management officers to serve as plan fiduciaries, ERISA all but invites 
conflicts of interest in plan administration”). 
222. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emps. Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050 
(7th Cir. 1987) (noting that ERISA sought to limit freedom of contract to 
protect pension participants, and they deserve a fair judicial hearing to 
determine their rights). 
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exhaustion requirement) prior to seeking review in the federal 
courts.223 
Section 503 of ERISA provides: 
 
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, 
every employee benefit plan shall—(1) provide 
adequate notice in writing to any participant or 
beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the 
plan has been denied, setting forth the specific 
reasons for such denial, written in a manner 
calculated to be understood by the participant, 
and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any 
participant whose claim for benefits has been 
denied for a full and fair review by the 
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision 
denying the claim.224 
 
The text above does not require that a claimant exhaust 
the plan’s review process prior to seeking review of the benefit 
determination in the courts. 225 Yet courts have held exhaustion 
of a plan’s internal administrative remedies to be mandatory 
with very limited exceptions.226 In effect, the courts have 
required that claimants petition the very administrator(s) who 
initially rejected their claims prior to seeking any assistance 
from the courts.227 
Courts have relied on ERISA’s text and legislative history 
to justify requiring exhaustion of internal remedies prior to 
seeking recourse in the courts.228 In ERISA’s requirement that 
benefit plans have internal claims procedures for participants 
who want to petition the plan to review its decision to deny 
benefits, the courts have found that Congress intended the 
procedures to be used for all benefits claims.229 Courts relied on 
 
223. Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980). 
224. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133. 
225. DeBofsky, supra note 209, at 732. 
226. Id.; Conison, supra note 191, at 21-22; LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 
26, at 754-56. 
227. Amato, 618 F.2d at 569. 
228. Id. at 566. 
229. Id. at 567 (“It would certainly be anomalous if the same good 
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/6
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Congress’ supposed concern with efficient resolution of ERISA 
claims—favoring efficiency over correcting flawed decisions.230 
According to one district court, it is in the best interests of both 
employers and employees that costs of administering benefit 
claims be minimized: 
 
If claimants were allowed to litigate the validity 
of their claims before a final trustee decision was 
rendered, the costs of dispute settlement would 
increase markedly for employers. Employees 
would also suffer financially because, rather than 
utilize a simple procedure which allows them to 
deal directly with their employer, they would 
have to employ an attorney and bear the costs of 
adversary litigation in the courts.231 
 
The courts even justified the exhaustion requirement as a 
burden that Congress had placed on fiduciaries to review their 
actions and efficiently enforce the plan’s provisions.232 In Maker 
 
reasons that presumably led Congress and the Secretary to require covered 
plans to provide administrative remedies for aggrieved claimants did not lead 
the courts to see that those remedies are regularly used.”). 
230. Makar v. Health Care Corp. of Mid-Atlantic, 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted) (“Congress’ apparent intent in 
mandating these internal claims procedures was to minimize the number of 
frivolous ERISA lawsuits; promote the consistent treatment of benefit claims; 
provide a nonadversarial dispute resolution process; and decrease the cost 
and time of claims settlement.” (emphasis added)); Taylor v. Bakery & 
Confectionary Workers Union & Indus. Int’l Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816, 
820 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (internal citations omitted) (“Tied to these inter-fund 
claims procedures was Congress’ awareness of the potential costs of pension 
reform, and it sought to ‘strike a balance between providing meaningful 
reform and keeping costs within reasonable limits.’ Congress was particularly 
concerned with outlining a private insurance system that would operate 
efficiently, thereby increasing its acceptance and institution among American 
business.”). 
231. Taylor, 455 F. Supp. at 820. 
232. Makar, 872 F.2d at 83 (internal citations omitted) (“By preventing 
premature interference with an employee benefit plan’s remedial provisions, 
the exhaustion requirement enables plan fiduciaries to efficiently manage 
their funds; correct their errors; interpret plan provisions; and assemble a 
factual record which will assist a court in reviewing the fiduciaries’ actions.”); 
Denton v. First Nat’l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1303 n.13 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“Another important facet of the exhaustion requirement is that it prevents 
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v. Health Care Corporation of Mid-Atlantic, the court states 
that “[i]n short, Congress intended plan fiduciaries, not the 
federal courts, to have primary responsibility for claims 
processing.”233 
Contrary to the rule adopted by the courts, the legislative 
history indicates that Congress required claims procedures 
merely to provide another avenue to address participant 
grievances.234 The House labor bill did not require an internal 
claims review procedure.235 While the Senate labor bill did 
include a version of ERISA Section 503, the bill that went to 
the conference committee instead provided for voluntary 
arbitration.236 The main concern was protecting participants 
and giving them easy, cheap ways to recover their benefits.237 
As Senator Williams stated, a participant or beneficiary “would 
have the right” to know why his or her claims was denied and 
“would be entitled to a full and fair review.”238 This language 
focuses on the participant or beneficiary’s rights – not the 
employer’s rights. The adoption of an exhaustion requirement 
actually represented a step backwards from state law pre-
ERISA.239 
 
Congress unquestionably intended courts to 
develop some set of rules to govern actions for 
benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B). But the rules 
 
fiduciaries from avoiding their duties under the Plan by insulating all benefit 
decisions in the protective mantel of federal judicial review. If fiduciaries were 
to find their decisions more closely supervised by an intervening federal 
judiciary, it is likely that they would go to court to seek instruction by 
declaratory relief on questions involving claims for benefits, rather than 
deciding those questions themselves as Congress intended.”); Amato, 618 F.2d 
at 567 (“[I]mplementation of the exhaustion requirement will enhance their 
ability to expertly and efficiently manage their funds by preventing 
premature judicial intervention in their decision-making processes.”). 
233. Makar, 872 F.2d at 83 (4th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). 
234. Conison, supra note 191, at 24. 
235. Id. at 22. 
236. Id. at 22-23. 
237. Id. at 24. 
238. Id. at 25. 
239. Id. (“Thus, the legislative history provides no support for the view 
that a suit for benefits was intended to be the second, appellate stage of a 
process beginning with the plan claims procedures.”). 
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developed must be consistent with the purposes 
of ERISA. The current law pays little attention 
to ERISA’s central purpose of safeguarding 
benefit expectations. Indeed, it often seems 
perversely designed to thwart benefit 
expectations, for no better reason than judicial 
force of habit.240 
 
While Frank Cummings worried about the dollar amounts 
of pension claims being too small to motivate lawyers to take 
the cases as necessary to pursue a participant’s rights, perhaps 
he should instead have worried about whether the courts would 
be willing to review pension cases. As Law Professor Jay 
Conison argues, “the main policy argument advanced for 
deference has been that it reduces judicial caseload,” but this 
was not the concern of ERISA.241 Courts are hostile to benefit 
claims because they are fact-intensive and usually involve 
small value claims, even though there is no evidence that a less 
deferential standard of review would overwhelm court 
dockets.242 Regardless, Congress mandated that courts decide 
benefit claims, and the judicial thwarting of its role has 
allowed governmental control over retirement security to flow 
unhindered to the private sector.243 
 
B. Bring on the “Death Panels” 
 
The furor over the myth that new healthcare legislation 
would ration healthcare and engage in a form of euthanasia 
attracted great attention and caused a provision reimbursing 
for end-of-life discussions between doctors and patients to be 
removed prior to passage of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).244 A draft of the legislation 
included under the heading “Advanced Care Planning 
 
240. Conison, supra note 191, at 3. 
241. Id. at 61. 
242. See id. (“[T]he control argument is speculative.”). 
243. See id. 
244. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th 
CONG. (2009). 
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Consultation” authorized Medicare reimbursement for doctors 
who counseled patients on end-of-life issues ranging from 
palliative care to living wills, health proxies, and powers of 
attorney. 245 When politicians and pundits on the right became 
involved, however, the provision took on a very different 
meaning. Sarah Palin’s inflammatory Facebook posting is 
illustrative: 
 
The America I know and love is not one in which 
my parents or my baby with Down Syndrome 
will have to stand in front of Obama’s ‘death 
panel’ so his bureaucrats can decide, based on a 
subjective judgment of their ‘level of productivity 
in society,’ whether they are worthy of health 
care. Such a system is downright evil.246 
 
Called the “Lie of the Year” by the website PolitiFact, Palin’s 
comment was merely one example of the rhetoric on the right 
“mischaracterize[ing] as bureaucratic ‘death panels’” such end-
of-life consultations.247 
More outrage erupted when economist and New York 
Times contributor Paul Krugman announced that the solution 
to the budget deficit “will and should rely on both ‘death panels 
and sales taxes.’”248 His point was that healthcare cost 
containment is necessary and inevitable and that a cost-benefit 
 
245. Id. at § 1233. 
246. Paul Westfall, Ethically Economic: The Affordable Care Act’s 
Impact on the Administration of Health Benefits, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE 
L. 99, 109-10 (2011) (quoting Palin’s well-known Facebook posting); see 
Joshua E. Perry, A Missed Opportunity: Health Care Reform, Rhetoric, Ethics 
and Economics at the End of Life, 29 MISS. C. L. REV. 409, 411-12 (2010). 
247. Perry, supra note 246, at 412 (citing comments on Fred Thompson’s 
July 16, 2009 radio show that the provision “‘would make it mandatory—
absolutely require—that every five years people in Medicare [would be 
required to have a] counseling session that will tell them how to end their life 
sooner’” and by Republican House Leader John Boehner that it “‘may start us 
down a treacherous path toward government-encouraged euthanasia if 
enacted into law’”). 
248. Paul Krugman, Death Panels and Sales Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.14, 
2010, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/death-panels-and-sales-
taxes/?_r=0. 
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analysis for all medical treatments will be necessary.249 The 
nation’s healthcare system must ration healthcare to be 
financially sustainable. The less well-known and discussed 
reality is that ERISA fiduciaries ration healthcare every day 
with little review of their decisions by courts as a result of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.250 
While the legislative history of ERISA focuses on pension 
reform, ERISA dramatically altered healthcare in the United 
States with few outside the industry aware of the changes. 
ERISA did not impose detailed rules for the provision of health 
benefits by employers other than reporting and disclosure 
requirements and fiduciary protections.251 Yet the courts’ use of 
the arbitrary and capricious standard to review benefit claims 
applied to health plans as well, and ERISA’s broad preemption 
clause effectively allowed employers and health insurance 
companies to opt in to the generous deference provided by 
courts to ERISA-covered benefit plans through self-
insurance.252 
ERISA’s preemption clause allowed employers to avoid 
state regulation of healthcare and deny benefits to an 
increasing number of participants.253 The clause mandates that 
ERISA “supercede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” with 
an exception for any law that “regulates insurance, banking, or 
securities.”254 The “deemer clause” then prevents the 
application of these state insurance, banking, and securities 
laws to employee benefit plans. In the case of health plans, the 
“deemer clause”255 provides that an employee benefit plan will 
not be “deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . 
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(addressing opportunities to provide less deference to the decisions of self-
funded health insurance plan administrators than the courts currently 
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. or to be engaged in the business of insurance” for the purpose 
of state insurance laws.256 
To take advantage of the pre-emption of state laws and the 
favorable standard of review for benefit claims, particularly 
when healthcare costs started to skyrocket in the 1980s, many 
additional employers began to self-insure.257 Although at the 
time of ERISA large health plans had begun to self-insure, the 
trend now included many smaller plans.258 The development of 
utilization review brought employers administering health 
plans and their third party administrators (often insurance 
companies) into diagnostic decisions.259 The plans now 
frequently had to approve healthcare decisions before the 
services could be provided—in effect deciding what type of care 
an employee or relative could receive.260 
Self-insurance benefited employers with little risk of 
significant liability.261 Employers purchased “stop-loss” policies 
to prevent unanticipated liability if benefit payments exceeded 
estimated costs.262 Additionally, employers increasingly denied 
benefit claims through utilization review, while plan 
participants faced an uphill battle appealing denials in court.263 
At worst, the plan would have to pay the claim and attorneys’ 
fees after a lawsuit because courts also interpreted ERISA’s 
remedies narrowly.264 Scandals over bad faith denials of benefit 
claims were exposed slowly and called into question the 
involvement of ERISA fiduciaries in healthcare decisions.265 
Courts downplayed the conflict of interest faced by these 
fiduciaries deciding benefit claims.266 They argued that “small” 
benefit claims did not make an administrator at a company 
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with billions of dollars in annual revenue conflicted.267 Yet the 
pattern of denial of small benefit claims added up to significant 
additional revenue.268 Courts also found comfort in employers’ 
reputational concerns, arguing that if their health plans 
unfairly denied benefit claims, employees would go 
elsewhere.269 Given the opaque process of deciding benefit 
claims, however, employees had little chance to compare 
employers based on their administration of health plans.270 
Employers and third party administrators also had significant 
financial incentives to deny claims that overrode reputational 
concerns.271 Finally, courts argued that benefit costs were 
passed on to employers through experience rating later.272 In 
the competitive insurance market, insurance companies needed 
to absorb much of the unexpected costs, though.273 
Given their outrage over the idea of the government 
rationing healthcare, Americans obviously do not understand 
the extent to which employers and insurance companies 
already ration healthcare to contain costs. While there is hope 
that the ACA’s provisions requiring external review will 
provide an opportunity to increase the fairness of decisions by 
administrators of health plans,274 the political pressure applied 
by employers and insurance companies to contain costs and 
increase profits will be difficult to resist. 
The idea of rationing healthcare by denying benefit claims 
attracted significant attention, but the crisis caused by denying 
pension benefit claims attracts little attention. Perhaps the 
decline in defined benefit pensions has ameliorated the effects 
of these benefit denials. Or maybe the economic recession made 
salary the primary concern of the workforce. Employees also 
notoriously discount the value of pension benefits when they 
are younger. Regardless, the debate over rationing healthcare 
may be the foot in the door necessary to change the arbitrary 
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and capricious standard currently being used by courts to 
review ERISA benefit claims. 
As the ACA begins the process of revamping our 
healthcare system, the question of who should ration access to 
traditional employee benefits such as healthcare and private 
pensions needs to be addressed. If employers and insurance 
companies retain control over healthcare decisions, then there 
is no chance to better protect pension promises. If, however, the 
external review process for health claims provides for review by 
a neutral party or simply eliminates the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review for health plans, pension claims 
should not be left behind. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The United States is not the only country whose judiciary 
has failed to adequately protect pension beneficiaries when 
available tools made it possible. Law Professor Elizabeth 
Shilton declared, “[f]or employee pension rights [in Canada], 
the promise of trust law has proved to be a false one.”275 
Recognizing that courts “share a responsibility with 
legislatures for distributive outcomes within employment 
pension plans,” Shilton takes issue with the abdication of 
Canadian courts in their role as protectors of employee pension 
rights.276 In the end, Shilton finds that the need to facilitate 
voluntary pensions overcomes the moral aspect of the fiduciary 
duties inherent in trust law.277 “If employers can over-ride the 
most ‘fundamental’ characteristics of a trust simply by 
inserting explicit wording, then it is employers, rather than the 
courts, who will ultimately define the scope and content of 
trust commitments.”278 
Refusing to absolve judges of their responsibility for the 
turn that pension law has taken in Canada, Shilton notes, 
“[t]he analysis of the case law in this paper has identified 
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numerous analytic nodes where courts applying the common 
law have made choices—choices not dictated by ‘the law,’ but 
by predispositions and values, and the weighing of those policy 
factors they identify as relevant and important.”279 While 
acknowledging the need for additional legislation to safeguard 
employee pension rights and the hesitancy of the legislature to 
act on this sensitive issue, Shilton sees an important role for 
the courts in shifting the common law and finding a stronger 
role for fiduciary protections.280 
Similarly, I argue here that the failure to create a single, 
expert bureaucratic agency to supervise Congress’ delegation of 
authority to private fiduciaries has left the courts as the only 
government institution capable of properly supervising 
fiduciaries and finally creating a coherent body of pension 
policy that focuses on protecting workers’ expectations. The 
courts have made choices, as Shilton says, and these choices 
were not mandated by ERISA but instead based on factors 
important to the judges and fear of involvement in this 
unwieldy statute. It is time for the courts to reexamine 
ERISA’s legislative history and focus on its underlying goals. 
Congress did not mandate a highly deferential standard of 
review for benefit claims or a restriction on the types of 
evidence that courts will hear; the courts did. The courts, 
therefore, can find a way to better enforce pension promises. 
 
 
 
279. Id. at 113. 
280. Id. at 114. 
57
